The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal
Publication
, Journal Article
Richman, B
Published in: Virginia Law Review
2009
Duke Scholars
Published In
Virginia Law Review
Publication Date
2009
Volume
95
Start / End Page
325 / 387
Related Subject Headings
- Law
- 48 Law and legal studies
- 1801 Law
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Richman, B. (2009). The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal. Virginia Law Review, 95, 325–387.
Richman, B. “The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal.” Virginia Law Review 95 (2009): 325–87.
Richman B. The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal. Virginia Law Review. 2009;95:325–87.
Richman, B. “The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal.” Virginia Law Review, vol. 95, 2009, pp. 325–87.
Richman B. The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal. Virginia Law Review. 2009;95:325–387.
Published In
Virginia Law Review
Publication Date
2009
Volume
95
Start / End Page
325 / 387
Related Subject Headings
- Law
- 48 Law and legal studies
- 1801 Law