Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules

Published

Journal Article

This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making, in which information must be collected from a strategic lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and determines whether the proposal is processed under open or closed rule. Consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the legislature to appoint a biased committee and, depending on the lobbyist's bias, both open and closed rule are used in equilibrium. For small lobbyist bias, it is optimal to choose closed rule and a committee whose interests are perfectly aligned with the lobbyist's. For intermediate lobbyist bias, closed rule remains optimal with a committee whose preferences lie between those of the legislature and those of the lobbyist. For large lobbyist bias, open rule and a committee biased against the lobbyist become optimal. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Ambrus, A; Azevedo, EM; Kamada, Y; Takagi, Y

Published Date

  • October 1, 2013

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 94 /

Start / End Page

  • 103 - 115

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-2681

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.003

Citation Source

  • Scopus