Innovation incentives under transferable fast-track regulatory review

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Under a 2007 U.S. law, the developer of a treatment for a neglected disease is rewarded with a fast-track voucher that can be sold to another developer. Similar fast-track vouchers are being offered by other agencies. We model how the existence of transferable, fast-track vouchers can impact innovation for both humanitarian and other products, and can create competition between otherwise unrelated pursuits. We consider the tradability of fast-track vouchers and map these to innovation race outcomes. Our analysis highlights areas for further exploration in policy settings as well as predictions for empirical analysis. © 2013 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Gans, JS; Ridley, DB

Published Date

  • September 1, 2013

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 61 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 789 - 816

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1467-6451

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-1821

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/joie.12026

Citation Source

  • Scopus