A contrastivist manifesto
Publication
, Journal Article
Sinnott-Armstrong, W
Published in: Social Epistemology
July 1, 2008
General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. This view contrasts with contextualism, invariantism, and Schaffer's contrastivism.
Duke Scholars
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Published In
Social Epistemology
DOI
EISSN
1464-5297
ISSN
0269-1728
Publication Date
July 1, 2008
Volume
22
Issue
3
Start / End Page
257 / 270
Related Subject Headings
- Science Studies
- 5003 Philosophy
- 2203 Philosophy
- 1702 Cognitive Sciences
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). A contrastivist manifesto. Social Epistemology, 22(3), 257–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691720802546120
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “A contrastivist manifesto.” Social Epistemology 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 257–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691720802546120.
Sinnott-Armstrong W. A contrastivist manifesto. Social Epistemology. 2008 Jul 1;22(3):257–70.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “A contrastivist manifesto.” Social Epistemology, vol. 22, no. 3, July 2008, pp. 257–70. Scopus, doi:10.1080/02691720802546120.
Sinnott-Armstrong W. A contrastivist manifesto. Social Epistemology. 2008 Jul 1;22(3):257–270.
Published In
Social Epistemology
DOI
EISSN
1464-5297
ISSN
0269-1728
Publication Date
July 1, 2008
Volume
22
Issue
3
Start / End Page
257 / 270
Related Subject Headings
- Science Studies
- 5003 Philosophy
- 2203 Philosophy
- 1702 Cognitive Sciences