Are generic predictions enough?
I have argued not that economics has no predictive content, but that it is limited, or at least has so far been limited to generic predictions. Now this is an important kind of prediction, and almost certainly a necessary preliminary to specific or quantitative predictions. But if the sketch of an important episode in the twentieth century history of the subject I have given is both correct and representative, then economics seems pretty well stuck at the level of generic prediction. And at least some influential economists and philosophers of economics seem well satisfied with stopping at the point of generic prediction. Or at least they give no other reason than its power to produce such predictions as a justification for the character of economic theory. But this leads to the question that is the title of my paper, is generic prediction enough? © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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- 2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields
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Published In
DOI
EISSN
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Philosophy
- 2203 Philosophy
- 2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields