The New Politics of the Welfare State
Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment, When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?
Publication
, Chapter
Kitschelt, HP
2001
Duke Scholars
Publication Date
2001
Start / End Page
265 / 302
Publisher
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Citation
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Kitschelt, H. P. (2001). Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment, When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies? In P. Pierson (Ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (pp. 265–302). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kitschelt, H. P. “Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment, When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?” In The New Politics of the Welfare State, edited by Paul Pierson, 265–302. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Kitschelt HP. Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment, When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies? In: Pierson P, editor. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2001. p. 265–302.
Kitschelt, H. P. “Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment, When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?” The New Politics of the Welfare State, edited by Paul Pierson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 265–302.
Kitschelt HP. Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment, When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies? In: Pierson P, editor. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2001. p. 265–302.
Publication Date
2001
Start / End Page
265 / 302
Publisher
Oxford: Oxford University Press