The effects of public information with asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors
This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information influences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. We identify conditions under which public information increases or decreases price informativeness, and when multiple equilibria may arise. Our analysis shows that public information not only directly endows prices with more (public) information, it can also have an important indirect effect on the degree to which prices reveal private information. ©, University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2014.
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Related Subject Headings
- Accounting
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Citation
Published In
DOI
EISSN
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Accounting
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability