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Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default

Publication ,  Journal Article
Schwarcz, S
Published in: Yale Journal on Regulation
2014

Duke Scholars

Published In

Yale Journal on Regulation

Publication Date

2014

Volume

31

Start / End Page

269 / 302

Related Subject Headings

  • 1801 Law
 

Citation

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Schwarcz, S. (2014). Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default. Yale Journal on Regulation, 31, 269–302.
Schwarcz, S. “Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default.” Yale Journal on Regulation 31 (2014): 269–302.
Schwarcz S. Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default. Yale Journal on Regulation. 2014;31:269–302.
Schwarcz, S. “Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default.” Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 31, 2014, pp. 269–302.
Schwarcz S. Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default. Yale Journal on Regulation. 2014;31:269–302.

Published In

Yale Journal on Regulation

Publication Date

2014

Volume

31

Start / End Page

269 / 302

Related Subject Headings

  • 1801 Law