Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in zambia
Publication
, Journal Article
Ashraf, N; Field, E; Lee, J
Published in: American Economic Review
January 1, 2014
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women givenaccess with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable.
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Published In
American Economic Review
DOI
ISSN
0002-8282
Publication Date
January 1, 2014
Volume
104
Issue
7
Start / End Page
2210 / 2237
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 35 Commerce, management, tourism and services
- 15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
- 14 Economics
Citation
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Ashraf, N., Field, E., & Lee, J. (2014). Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in zambia. American Economic Review, 104(7), 2210–2237. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.7.2210
Ashraf, N., E. Field, and J. Lee. “Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in zambia.” American Economic Review 104, no. 7 (January 1, 2014): 2210–37. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.7.2210.
Ashraf N, Field E, Lee J. Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in zambia. American Economic Review. 2014 Jan 1;104(7):2210–37.
Ashraf, N., et al. “Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in zambia.” American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 7, Jan. 2014, pp. 2210–37. Scopus, doi:10.1257/aer.104.7.2210.
Ashraf N, Field E, Lee J. Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in zambia. American Economic Review. 2014 Jan 1;104(7):2210–2237.
Published In
American Economic Review
DOI
ISSN
0002-8282
Publication Date
January 1, 2014
Volume
104
Issue
7
Start / End Page
2210 / 2237
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 35 Commerce, management, tourism and services
- 15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
- 14 Economics