Primate Social Cognition: Thirty Years After Premack and Woodruff
This chapter addresses two aspects of primate social cognition-understanding of intentional, goal-directed action, and understanding perceptions, knowledge, and beliefs-focusing on the newest comparative research since the last major reviews were written on the topic over a decade ago. It first reviews evidence suggesting that diverse species of primates understand the actions of others in terms of goals and intentions, and furthermore can reason about some, but probably not all, kinds of psychological states. It then examines the hypothesis that primates show their most complex social skills in competitive contexts, and suggests that inquiry into other aspects of primate social life, such as cooperative interactions, may prove to be the next important step for experimental inquiries into primate social-cognitive skills. Finally, the chapter examines primate social cognition in a broader evolutionary context that may provide a better understanding of both primate and human cognitive skills.
Duke Scholars
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