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Catcher-evader games

Publication ,  Journal Article
Li, Y; Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D
Published in: IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
January 1, 2016

Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have recently been applied to a number of security domains. However, many of the techniques developed for compact representations of security games do not extend to Bayesian security games, which allow us to model uncertainty about the attacker's type. In this paper, we introduce a general framework of catcher-evader games that can capture Bayesian security games as well as other game families of interest. We show that computing Stackelberg strategies is NP-hard, but give an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium that performs well in experiments. We also prove that the Nash equilibria of these games satisfy the interchangeability property, so that equilibrium selection is not an issue.

Duke Scholars

Published In

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

ISSN

1045-0823

Publication Date

January 1, 2016

Volume

2016-January

Start / End Page

329 / 337
 

Citation

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Li, Y., Conitzer, V., & Korzhyk, D. (2016). Catcher-evader games. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016-January, 329–337.
Li, Y., V. Conitzer, and D. Korzhyk. “Catcher-evader games.” IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2016-January (January 1, 2016): 329–37.
Li Y, Conitzer V, Korzhyk D. Catcher-evader games. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2016 Jan 1;2016-January:329–37.
Li, Y., et al. “Catcher-evader games.” IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January, Jan. 2016, pp. 329–37.
Li Y, Conitzer V, Korzhyk D. Catcher-evader games. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2016 Jan 1;2016-January:329–337.

Published In

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

ISSN

1045-0823

Publication Date

January 1, 2016

Volume

2016-January

Start / End Page

329 / 337