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Multiagent mechanism design without money

Publication ,  Journal Article
Balseiro, SR; Gurkan, H; Sun, P
Published in: Operations Research
January 1, 2019

We consider a principal repeatedly allocating a single resource in each period to one of multiple agents, whose values are private, without relying on monetary payments over an infinite horizon with discounting. We design a dynamic mechanism that induces agents to report their values truthfully in each period via promises/threats of future favorable/unfavorable allocations. We show that our mechanism asymptotically achieves the first-best efficient allocation (the welfare-maximizing allocation as if values are public) as agents become more patient and provide sharp characterizations of convergence rates to first best as a function of the discount factor. In particular, in the case of two agents we prove that the convergence rate of our mechanism is optimal - that is, no other mechanism can converge faster to first best.

Duke Scholars

Published In

Operations Research

DOI

EISSN

1526-5463

ISSN

0030-364X

Publication Date

January 1, 2019

Volume

67

Issue

5

Start / End Page

1417 / 1436

Related Subject Headings

  • Operations Research
  • 3507 Strategy, management and organisational behaviour
  • 1503 Business and Management
  • 0802 Computation Theory and Mathematics
  • 0102 Applied Mathematics
 

Citation

APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Balseiro, S. R., Gurkan, H., & Sun, P. (2019). Multiagent mechanism design without money. Operations Research, 67(5), 1417–1436. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1820
Balseiro, S. R., H. Gurkan, and P. Sun. “Multiagent mechanism design without money.” Operations Research 67, no. 5 (January 1, 2019): 1417–36. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1820.
Balseiro SR, Gurkan H, Sun P. Multiagent mechanism design without money. Operations Research. 2019 Jan 1;67(5):1417–36.
Balseiro, S. R., et al. “Multiagent mechanism design without money.” Operations Research, vol. 67, no. 5, Jan. 2019, pp. 1417–36. Scopus, doi:10.1287/opre.2018.1820.
Balseiro SR, Gurkan H, Sun P. Multiagent mechanism design without money. Operations Research. 2019 Jan 1;67(5):1417–1436.

Published In

Operations Research

DOI

EISSN

1526-5463

ISSN

0030-364X

Publication Date

January 1, 2019

Volume

67

Issue

5

Start / End Page

1417 / 1436

Related Subject Headings

  • Operations Research
  • 3507 Strategy, management and organisational behaviour
  • 1503 Business and Management
  • 0802 Computation Theory and Mathematics
  • 0102 Applied Mathematics