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The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science

Publication ,  Journal Article
Gessell, B; De Brigard, F
Published in: Teorema
January 1, 2018

We begin by characterizing Dennett’s “homuncular functionalist” view of the mind, as described in his early work. We then contrast that view with the one outlined in From Bacteria to Bach and Back. We argue that recent changes in Dennett’s view have produced tension in the way he conceives of functional decompositions. Functional decompositions based on the intentional stance are supposed to reach a bottom, “dumb” level which can be explained mechanically; however, since Dennett now believes that neurons may need to be described intentionally, it is not clear whether our explanations of cognitive functions can ever align with our explanations of neuronal and network behaviors. We explore the consequences of this tension for Dennett’s view, and for cognitive neuroscience in general.

Duke Scholars

Published In

Teorema

ISSN

0210-1602

Publication Date

January 1, 2018

Volume

37

Issue

3

Start / End Page

151 / 165

Related Subject Headings

  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 2203 Philosophy
 

Citation

APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Gessell, B., & De Brigard, F. (2018). The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science. Teorema, 37(3), 151–165.
Gessell, B., and F. De Brigard. “The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science.” Teorema 37, no. 3 (January 1, 2018): 151–65.
Gessell B, De Brigard F. The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science. Teorema. 2018 Jan 1;37(3):151–65.
Gessell, B., and F. De Brigard. “The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science.” Teorema, vol. 37, no. 3, Jan. 2018, pp. 151–65.
Gessell B, De Brigard F. The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science. Teorema. 2018 Jan 1;37(3):151–165.

Published In

Teorema

ISSN

0210-1602

Publication Date

January 1, 2018

Volume

37

Issue

3

Start / End Page

151 / 165

Related Subject Headings

  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 2203 Philosophy