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Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness

Publication ,  Journal Article
Lim, D
Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
September 23, 2011

In his so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC), J.P. moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the correlation is necessary then a theistic explanation for the correlation is forfeit. Both are unwelcome results for AC. 

Duke Scholars

Published In

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

DOI

ISSN

1689-8311

Publication Date

September 23, 2011

Volume

3

Issue

2

Start / End Page

439 / 450

Publisher

Verein zur Forderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Related Subject Headings

  • 2204 Religion and Religious Studies
  • 2203 Philosophy
 

Citation

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Lim, D. (2011). Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 3(2), 439–450. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.405
Lim, Daniel. “Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3, no. 2 (September 23, 2011): 439–50. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.405.
Lim D. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 2011 Sep 23;3(2):439–50.
Lim, Daniel. “Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 3, no. 2, Verein zur Forderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Sept. 2011, pp. 439–50. Crossref, doi:10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.405.
Lim D. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Verein zur Forderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion; 2011 Sep 23;3(2):439–450.

Published In

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

DOI

ISSN

1689-8311

Publication Date

September 23, 2011

Volume

3

Issue

2

Start / End Page

439 / 450

Publisher

Verein zur Forderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Related Subject Headings

  • 2204 Religion and Religious Studies
  • 2203 Philosophy