Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted
Publication
, Journal Article
Garrett, B; Li, N; Rajgopal, S
Published in: Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting
2019
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting
Publication Date
2019
Volume
4
Issue
2
Start / End Page
137 / 181
Related Subject Headings
- 4801 Commercial law
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Garrett, B., Li, N., & Rajgopal, S. (2019). Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted. Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 4(2), 137–181.
Garrett, B., N. Li, and S. Rajgopal. “Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted.” Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting 4, no. 2 (2019): 137–81.
Garrett B, Li N, Rajgopal S. Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted. Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting. 2019;4(2):137–81.
Garrett, B., et al. “Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted.” Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, vol. 4, no. 2, 2019, pp. 137–81.
Garrett B, Li N, Rajgopal S. Do Heads Roll?: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and Pay When the Corporation is Federally Prosecuted. Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting. 2019;4(2):137–181.
Published In
Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting
Publication Date
2019
Volume
4
Issue
2
Start / End Page
137 / 181
Related Subject Headings
- 4801 Commercial law
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability