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Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems

Publication ,  Journal Article
De Brigard, F
Published in: Philosophical Psychology
January 1, 2019

A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I arguethat, currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms thatdo not correspond to categories in psychological science. As aresult, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a vocabularythat is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settledempirically.

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Published In

Philosophical Psychology

DOI

EISSN

1465-394X

ISSN

0951-5089

Publication Date

January 1, 2019

Volume

32

Issue

5

Start / End Page

719 / 758

Related Subject Headings

  • Experimental Psychology
  • 5204 Cognitive and computational psychology
  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 2203 Philosophy
  • 1702 Cognitive Sciences
  • 1701 Psychology
 

Citation

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De Brigard, F. (2019). Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems. Philosophical Psychology, 32(5), 719–758. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280
De Brigard, F. “Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems.” Philosophical Psychology 32, no. 5 (January 1, 2019): 719–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280.
De Brigard F. Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems. Philosophical Psychology. 2019 Jan 1;32(5):719–58.
De Brigard, F. “Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems.” Philosophical Psychology, vol. 32, no. 5, Jan. 2019, pp. 719–58. Scopus, doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280.
De Brigard F. Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems. Philosophical Psychology. 2019 Jan 1;32(5):719–758.

Published In

Philosophical Psychology

DOI

EISSN

1465-394X

ISSN

0951-5089

Publication Date

January 1, 2019

Volume

32

Issue

5

Start / End Page

719 / 758

Related Subject Headings

  • Experimental Psychology
  • 5204 Cognitive and computational psychology
  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 2203 Philosophy
  • 1702 Cognitive Sciences
  • 1701 Psychology