Epistemic structural realism and poincaré’s philosophy of science

Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from John Worrall’s “Structural Realism” in which he defends a position (since characterized “epistemic structural realism”) whose historical roots he attributes to Poincaré. In the renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincaré’sname associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincaré’s structuralism is deeply entwined with neo-Kantianism and the roles of convention and objectivity within science. In this article we explore the nature of these dependencies. What emerges is not only a clearer picture of Poincaré’s position regarding structuralism but also two arguments for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that of Worrall.

Duke Scholars

Author Katherine A. Brading Philosophy