Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
Publication
, Journal Article
Loertscher, S; Marx, LM
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory
May 1, 2020
Clock auctions have a number of properties that make them attractive for practical purposes. They are weakly group strategy-proof, make bidding truthfully an obviously dominant strategy, and preserve trading agents' privacy. However, optimal reserve prices and stopping rules depend on the details of underlying distributions, and so clock auctions have proved challenging to implement in a prior-free, asymptotically optimal way. In this paper, we develop a prior-free clock auction that is asymptotically optimal by exploiting a relationship between hazard rates and the spacings between order statistics. Extensions permit price discrimination among heterogeneous groups, minimum revenue thresholds, and quantity caps.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1095-7235
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
May 1, 2020
Volume
187
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Loertscher, S., & Marx, L. M. (2020). Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 187 (May 1, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030.
Loertscher S, Marx LM. Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2020 May 1;187.
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 187, May 2020. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030.
Loertscher S, Marx LM. Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2020 May 1;187.
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1095-7235
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
May 1, 2020
Volume
187
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory