Human uniqueness and theoretical content in paleoanthropology

One of the things that distinguishes science from nonscientific discourse is the incorporation of its hypotheses into theoretical structures. Like parapsychology, the study of human evolution lacks theoretical content and connections. This lack is due, in part, to the collapse of the classical primatological synthesis in the 1970s. It is due in larger measure to a persistent anthropological focus on human uniqueness as the phenomenon to be explained. Such supposedly unique human features as large brains, language, conceptual thinking, and upright bipedalism are uniquely human by definition rather than as a matter of empirical fact. Much scientific effort and ingenuity has gone into redefining such characteristics whenever discoveries about other animals have posed a threat to human uniqueness. But since by definition qualitatively unique phenomena do not conform to overarching laws that apply to similar cases, they must remain theoretically inexplicable. Paleoanthropology should aim at increasing its theoretical content by reducing the list of qualitative human uniquenesses-and eliminating it altogether if possible. © 1990 Plenum Publishing Corporation.

Duke Scholars

Author Matt Cartmill Evolutionary Anthropology