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The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence

Publication ,  Journal Article
Cooper, A; Munger, MC
Published in: Public Choice
January 1, 2000

It is common to describe the dynamic processes that generate outcomes in U.S. primaries as "unstable" or "unpredictable". In fact, the way we choose candidates may amount to a lottery. This paper uses a simulation approach, assuming 10,000 voters who vote according to a naive, deterministic proximity rule, but who choose party affiliation probabilistically. The voters of each party then must choose between two sets of ten randomly chosen candidates, in "closed" primaries. Finally, the winners of the two nominations compete in the general election, in which independent voters also participate. The key result of the simulations reported here is the complete unpredictability of the outcomes of a sequence of primaries: the winner of the primary, or the party's nominee, varied as much as two standard deviations from the median partisan voter. The reason is that the median, or any other measure of the center of the distribution of voters, is of little value in predicting the outcome of multicandidate elections. These results suggest that who runs may have more to do with who wins than any other consideration.

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Published In

Public Choice

DOI

ISSN

0048-5829

Publication Date

January 1, 2000

Volume

103

Issue

3-4

Start / End Page

337 / 355

Related Subject Headings

  • Economics
  • 4408 Political science
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1606 Political Science
  • 1402 Applied Economics
 

Citation

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Cooper, A., & Munger, M. C. (2000). The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence. Public Choice, 103(3–4), 337–355. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005150101110
Cooper, A., and M. C. Munger. “The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence.” Public Choice 103, no. 3–4 (January 1, 2000): 337–55. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005150101110.
Cooper A, Munger MC. The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence. Public Choice. 2000 Jan 1;103(3–4):337–55.
Cooper, A., and M. C. Munger. “The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence.” Public Choice, vol. 103, no. 3–4, Jan. 2000, pp. 337–55. Scopus, doi:10.1023/a:1005150101110.
Cooper A, Munger MC. The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence. Public Choice. 2000 Jan 1;103(3–4):337–355.
Journal cover image

Published In

Public Choice

DOI

ISSN

0048-5829

Publication Date

January 1, 2000

Volume

103

Issue

3-4

Start / End Page

337 / 355

Related Subject Headings

  • Economics
  • 4408 Political science
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1606 Political Science
  • 1402 Applied Economics