Skip to main content
Journal cover image

A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

Publication ,  Journal Article
Taylor, CR; Yildirim, H
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior
January 1, 2010

We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group. We relate our equilibrium characterization to Myerson's Poisson games, and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

Duke Scholars

Altmetric Attention Stats
Dimensions Citation Stats

Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

January 1, 2010

Volume

70

Issue

2

Start / End Page

457 / 471

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory
 

Citation

APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Taylor, C. R., & Yildirim, H. (2010). A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs. Games and Economic Behavior, 70(2), 457–471. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008
Taylor, C. R., and H. Yildirim. “A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs.” Games and Economic Behavior 70, no. 2 (January 1, 2010): 457–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008.
Taylor CR, Yildirim H. A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010 Jan 1;70(2):457–71.
Taylor, C. R., and H. Yildirim. “A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 70, no. 2, Jan. 2010, pp. 457–71. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008.
Taylor CR, Yildirim H. A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010 Jan 1;70(2):457–471.
Journal cover image

Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

January 1, 2010

Volume

70

Issue

2

Start / End Page

457 / 471

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory