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Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

Publication ,  Journal Article
Cusack, TR; Iversen, T; Soskice, D
Published in: American Political Science Review
August 1, 2007

The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus - we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.

Duke Scholars

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Published In

American Political Science Review

DOI

EISSN

1537-5943

ISSN

0003-0554

Publication Date

August 1, 2007

Volume

101

Issue

3

Start / End Page

373 / 391

Related Subject Headings

  • Political Science & Public Administration
  • 4408 Political science
  • 1606 Political Science
 

Citation

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ICMJE
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Cusack, T. R., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 101(3), 373–391. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070384
Cusack, T. R., T. Iversen, and D. Soskice. “Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems.” American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (August 1, 2007): 373–91. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070384.
Cusack TR, Iversen T, Soskice D. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. American Political Science Review. 2007 Aug 1;101(3):373–91.
Cusack, T. R., et al. “Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems.” American Political Science Review, vol. 101, no. 3, Aug. 2007, pp. 373–91. Scopus, doi:10.1017/S0003055407070384.
Cusack TR, Iversen T, Soskice D. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. American Political Science Review. 2007 Aug 1;101(3):373–391.
Journal cover image

Published In

American Political Science Review

DOI

EISSN

1537-5943

ISSN

0003-0554

Publication Date

August 1, 2007

Volume

101

Issue

3

Start / End Page

373 / 391

Related Subject Headings

  • Political Science & Public Administration
  • 4408 Political science
  • 1606 Political Science