College admissions with affirmative action
This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroǧ lu and Sönmez (2003). © Springer-Verlag 2005.
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Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 4901 Applied mathematics
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
- 0104 Statistics
- 0102 Applied Mathematics
Citation
Published In
DOI
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 4901 Applied mathematics
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
- 0104 Statistics
- 0102 Applied Mathematics