Skip to main content
Journal cover image

Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise

Publication ,  Journal Article
Kraines, D; Kraines, V
Published in: Theory and Decision
September 1, 1993

Conflict of interest may be modeled, heuristically, by the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although several researchers have shown that the Tit-For-Tat strategy can encourage the evolution of cooperation, this strategy can never outscore any opponent and it does poorly against its clone in a noisy environment. Here we examine the family of Pavlovian strategies which adapts its play by positive and negative conditioning, much as many animals do. Mutual cooperation will evolve in a contest with Pavlov against a wide variety of opponents and in particular against its clone. And the strategy is quite stable in a noisy environment. Although this strategy cooperates and retaliates, as does Tit-For-Tat, it is not forgiving; Pavlov will exploit altruistic strategies until he is punished by mutual defection. Moreover, Pavlovian strategies are natural models for many real life conflict-of-interest encounters as well as human and computer simulations. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Duke Scholars

Altmetric Attention Stats
Dimensions Citation Stats

Published In

Theory and Decision

DOI

EISSN

1573-7187

ISSN

0040-5833

Publication Date

September 1, 1993

Volume

35

Issue

2

Start / End Page

107 / 150

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 22 Philosophy and Religious Studies
  • 17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
  • 14 Economics
 

Citation

APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Kraines, D., & Kraines, V. (1993). Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise. Theory and Decision, 35(2), 107–150. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074955
Kraines, D., and V. Kraines. “Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise.” Theory and Decision 35, no. 2 (September 1, 1993): 107–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074955.
Kraines D, Kraines V. Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise. Theory and Decision. 1993 Sep 1;35(2):107–50.
Kraines, D., and V. Kraines. “Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise.” Theory and Decision, vol. 35, no. 2, Sept. 1993, pp. 107–50. Scopus, doi:10.1007/BF01074955.
Kraines D, Kraines V. Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise. Theory and Decision. 1993 Sep 1;35(2):107–150.
Journal cover image

Published In

Theory and Decision

DOI

EISSN

1573-7187

ISSN

0040-5833

Publication Date

September 1, 1993

Volume

35

Issue

2

Start / End Page

107 / 150

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 22 Philosophy and Religious Studies
  • 17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
  • 14 Economics