Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
Publication
, Journal Article
Lopomo, G; Marx, LM; Sun, P
Published in: Review of Economic Design
September 1, 2011
We show that in simple environments, a bidding ring operating at a first-price sealed-bid auction cannot achieve any gains relative to non-cooperative bidding if the ring is unable to control the bids that its members submit at the auction. This contrasts with results for the case in which the ring can control its members' bids or prevent all but one of the ring members from participating in the auction. Numerical examples suggest that this result extends to some more complex environments. The analytic results use linear programming techniques that have potential applications to a number of other economic problems. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Review of Economic Design
DOI
ISSN
1434-4742
Publication Date
September 1, 2011
Volume
15
Issue
3
Start / End Page
177 / 211
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1402 Applied Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Lopomo, G., Marx, L. M., & Sun, P. (2011). Bidder collusion at first-price auctions. Review of Economic Design, 15(3), 177–211. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9
Lopomo, G., L. M. Marx, and P. Sun. “Bidder collusion at first-price auctions.” Review of Economic Design 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 177–211. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9.
Lopomo G, Marx LM, Sun P. Bidder collusion at first-price auctions. Review of Economic Design. 2011 Sep 1;15(3):177–211.
Lopomo, G., et al. “Bidder collusion at first-price auctions.” Review of Economic Design, vol. 15, no. 3, Sept. 2011, pp. 177–211. Scopus, doi:10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9.
Lopomo G, Marx LM, Sun P. Bidder collusion at first-price auctions. Review of Economic Design. 2011 Sep 1;15(3):177–211.
Published In
Review of Economic Design
DOI
ISSN
1434-4742
Publication Date
September 1, 2011
Volume
15
Issue
3
Start / End Page
177 / 211
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1402 Applied Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory