Network effects in the governance of strategic alliances
We argue that the stock of prior alliances between participants in the biotechnology sector forms a network that serves as a governance mechanism in interfirm transactions. To test how this network substitutes for other governance mechanisms, we examine how equity participation and pledged funding in strategic alliances vary with two features of the way alliance participants are positioned in the network of past deals: proximity, or how close two firms are to one another in the network; and centrality, or how deeply a firm is embedded in the network. As centrality and proximity increase, equity participation (measured by size and propensity) diminishes, whereas pledged funding increases. © The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved.
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- Economics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1801 Law
- 1402 Applied Economics
Citation
Published In
DOI
EISSN
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1801 Law
- 1402 Applied Economics