The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction
Publication
, Journal Article
Brusco, S; Lopomo, G; Marx, LM
June 2009
We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses. These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids reached the C-block reserve price, thereby ensuring that the open platform restriction would be applied to the licenses. Later in the auction, other bidders outbid Google, so Google was able to trigger the open platform restriction without having to purchase any of the licenses.
Duke Scholars
Publication Date
June 2009
Volume
21
Issue
2
Start / End Page
101 / 114
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Brusco, S., Lopomo, G., & Marx, L. M. (2009). The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction, 21(2), 101–114.
Brusco, Sandro, Giuseppe Lopomo, and Leslie M. Marx. “The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction” 21, no. 2 (June 2009): 101–14.
Brusco S, Lopomo G, Marx LM. The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction. 2009 Jun;21(2):101–14.
Brusco, Sandro, et al. The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction. Vol. 21, no. 2, June 2009, pp. 101–14.
Brusco S, Lopomo G, Marx LM. The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction. 2009 Jun;21(2):101–114.
Publication Date
June 2009
Volume
21
Issue
2
Start / End Page
101 / 114