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Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses?

Publication ,  Journal Article
Sloan, FA; Platt, AC; Chepke, LM; Blevins, CE
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
February 1, 2013

This study presents an empirical analysis of domestic violence case resolution in North Carolina for the years 2004 to 2010. The key hypothesis is that penalties at the level set for domestic violence crimes reduce recidivism (re-arrest on domestic violence charges or conviction in 2 years following an index arrest). We use state court data for all domestic violence-related arrests. Decisions to commit an act of domestic violence are based on a Bayesian process of updating subjective beliefs. Individuals have prior beliefs about penalties for domestic violence based on actual practice in their areas. An individual's experience with an index arrest leads to belief updating. To address endogeneity of case outcomes, we use an instrumental variables strategy based on decisions of prosecutors and judges assigned to each index arrest in our sample. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that penalities, at least as set at the current levels, do not deter future arrests and convictions. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.

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Published In

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

DOI

EISSN

1573-0476

ISSN

0895-5646

Publication Date

February 1, 2013

Volume

46

Issue

1

Start / End Page

51 / 80

Related Subject Headings

  • Economics
  • 3802 Econometrics
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 3502 Banking, finance and investment
  • 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
  • 1402 Applied Economics
 

Citation

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Sloan, F. A., Platt, A. C., Chepke, L. M., & Blevins, C. E. (2013). Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 46(1), 51–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-012-9159-z
Sloan, F. A., A. C. Platt, L. M. Chepke, and C. E. Blevins. “Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses?Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 46, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 51–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-012-9159-z.
Sloan FA, Platt AC, Chepke LM, Blevins CE. Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2013 Feb 1;46(1):51–80.
Sloan, F. A., et al. “Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses?Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 46, no. 1, Feb. 2013, pp. 51–80. Scopus, doi:10.1007/s11166-012-9159-z.
Sloan FA, Platt AC, Chepke LM, Blevins CE. Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2013 Feb 1;46(1):51–80.
Journal cover image

Published In

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

DOI

EISSN

1573-0476

ISSN

0895-5646

Publication Date

February 1, 2013

Volume

46

Issue

1

Start / End Page

51 / 80

Related Subject Headings

  • Economics
  • 3802 Econometrics
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 3502 Banking, finance and investment
  • 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
  • 1402 Applied Economics