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Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations

Publication ,  Journal Article
Lenzo, J; Sarver, T
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior
August 1, 2006

We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior stationary state, Lyapunov stable state, or limit of an interior solution is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium. We provide an example with a Lyapunov stable limit state whose equivalent correlated equilibrium lies outside the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria. Finally, we prove that if the matching distribution is a product measure, a state satisfying any of the three conditions listed above is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Duke Scholars

Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

August 1, 2006

Volume

56

Issue

2

Start / End Page

271 / 284

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory
 

Citation

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ICMJE
MLA
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Lenzo, J., & Sarver, T. (2006). Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations. Games and Economic Behavior, 56(2), 271–284. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.012
Lenzo, J., and T. Sarver. “Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations.” Games and Economic Behavior 56, no. 2 (August 1, 2006): 271–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.012.
Lenzo J, Sarver T. Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations. Games and Economic Behavior. 2006 Aug 1;56(2):271–84.
Lenzo, J., and T. Sarver. “Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 56, no. 2, Aug. 2006, pp. 271–84. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.012.
Lenzo J, Sarver T. Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations. Games and Economic Behavior. 2006 Aug 1;56(2):271–284.
Journal cover image

Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

August 1, 2006

Volume

56

Issue

2

Start / End Page

271 / 284

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory