Adriano A. Rampini

Scholarly edition · January 1, 2019 We propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households, that is, have a collateralization advantage. Intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can le ... Full text Cite

Collateral, Financial Intermediation, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity

Scholarly edition · 2008 We study whether borrowers optimally conserve debt capacity to take advantage of investment opportunities due to temporarily low asset prices, when financing is subject to collateral constraints due to limited enforcement. We find that borrowers may exhaus ... Cite

Letting Go: Managerial Incentives and the Reallocation of Capital

Scholarly edition · 2004 This paper studies the provision of incentives to reallocate capital when managers are reluctant to relinquish control and have private information about the productivity of assets under their control. We show that when managers get private benefits from ... Cite

Endogenous Risk, Incentives and Aggregate Fluctuations

Scholarly edition This paper analyzes a model in which incentive constrained contracting implies both amplification and intertemporal propagation of technology shocks. In the model risk averse agents choose between a riskless technology and a risky technology (`the ent ... Cite