Attila Ambrus
Professor of Economics
Professor Ambrus’ research focuses on a broad range of subjects including game theory, experimental economics, microeconomic theory, industrial organization, political economics, development economics and economic history. He has received various grants from the National Science Foundation. His most recent work has been published in the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, and Theoretical Economics.
Current Appointments & Affiliations
- Professor of Economics, Economics, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences 2014
Contact Information
- 313 Social Sciences, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708
- Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708
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attila.ambrus@duke.edu
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Personal Website
- Background
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Education, Training, & Certifications
- Ph.D., Princeton University 2003
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Duke Appointment History
- Associate Professor in the Department of Economics, Economics, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences 2011 - 2014
- Recognition
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Awards & Honors
- Expertise
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Global Scholarship
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Expertise
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Research
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- Research
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Selected Grants
- Collaborative Research: The Economic Benefits of Investing into Social Relationships awarded by National Science Foundation 2014 - 2019
- Continuous-time Games With Asynchronus Moves: Theory and Applications awarded by National Science Foundation 2011 - 2016
- Collaborative Research: Estimating Compensated Discount Functions awarded by National Science Foundation 2011 - 2013
- Publications & Artistic Works
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Selected Publications
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Academic Articles
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Ambrus, A., E. Field, and R. Gonzalez. “Loss in the time of cholera: Long-run impact of a disease epidemic on the urban landscape.” American Economic Review 110, no. 2 (January 1, 2020): 475–525. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190759.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and A. Kolb. “On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior.” Economic Theory, January 1, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01292-y.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and B. Greiner. “Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability.” Journal of Public Economics 178 (October 1, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053.Full Text
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Ambrus, Attila, Ben Greiner, and Anita Zednik. “The Effects of a ‘None of the Above’ Ballot Paper Option on Voting Behavior and Election Outcomes.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 277 (March 14, 2019).
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Ambrus, A., E. Chaney, and I. Salitskiy. “Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information.” Quantitative Economics 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 217–46. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE655.Full Text
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Ambrus, Attila, Volodymyr Baranovskyi, and Aaron Kolb. “Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise'.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 194 (February 8, 2018).Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., B. Greiner, and A. Sastro. “The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems.” Journal of Public Economics 154 (October 1, 2017): 34–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.006.Full Text Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., E. Calvano, and M. Reisinger. “Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 3 (August 2016): 189–222. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150019.Full Text Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, Attila, and Ben Greiner. “Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 183 (August 26, 2015).Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, Attila, and Kareen Rozen. “Rationalising Choice with Multi‐self Models.” The Economic Journal 125, no. 585 (June 2015): 1136–56.
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Ambrus, Attila, and Yuhta Ishii. “On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 185 (March 23, 2015).Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, Attila, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, and Matthew Elliott. “Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 179 (March 16, 2015).
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Ambrus, A., T. L. Asgeirsdottir, J. Noor, and L. Sándor. “Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences'.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 169 (March 1, 2015).Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., and S. E. En Lu. “A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 208–49. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20100029.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and S. E. Lu. “Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders.” Games and Economic Behavior 88 (November 1, 2014): 174–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.001.Full Text
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Ambrus, Attila, Markus Mobius, and Adam Szeidl. “Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks.” American Economic Review 104, no. 1 (January 2014).
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Ambrus, A., E. M. Azevedo, Y. Kamada, and Y. Takagi. “Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 94 (October 1, 2013): 103–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.003.Full Text
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Ambrus, Attila, Yuhta Ishii, and James Burns. “Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 129 (September 5, 2013).Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., E. M. Azevedo, and Y. Kamada. “Hierarchical cheap talk.” Theoretical Economics 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 233–61. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1038.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and G. Egorov. “Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility".” Econometrica 81, no. 5 (January 1, 2013): 2113–24. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10739.Full Text
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Ambrus, Attila, Eduardo M. Azevedo, Yuichiro Kamada, and Yuki Takagi. “Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 94 (2013).
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Ambrus, A., and B. Greiner. “Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study.” American Economic Review 102, no. 7 (December 1, 2012): 3317–32. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3317.Full Text
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Ambrus, Attila, László Sándor, and Hye Young You. “Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, no. 122 (October 9, 2012).Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., and P. A. Pathak. “Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments.” Journal of Public Economics 95, no. 7–8 (August 1, 2011): 500–512. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.016.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., E. Field, and M. Torero. “Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements, and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, no. 3 (August 1, 2010): 1349–97. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1349.Full Text
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Ambrus, A. “Theories of coalitional rationality.” Journal of Economic Theory 144, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 676–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and R. Argenziano. “Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 17–52. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.1.17.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and J. Weinstein. “Price dispersion and loss leaders.” Theoretical Economics 3, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 525–37.
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Field, E., and A. Ambrus. “Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh.” Journal of Political Economy 116, no. 5 (October 1, 2008): 881–91. https://doi.org/10.1086/593333.Full Text
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Ambrus, A., and S. Takahashi. “Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces.” Theoretical Economics 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 1–27.
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Ambrus, A. “Coalitional rationalizability.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 3 (August 7, 2006): 903–29. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.121.3.903.Full Text
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Other Articles
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Ambrus, Attila, Volodymyr Baranovskyi, and Aaron Kolb. “A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, February 8, 2018.Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., and G. Egorov. “Delegation and nonmonetary incentives.” Journal of Economic Theory, September 1, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002.Full Text Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, Attila, and Georgy Egorov. “Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives'.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, December 4, 2015.Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., T. Ásgeirsdóttir, J. Noor, and L. Sandor. “Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid), March 1, 2015.
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Ambrus, Attila, Ben Greiner, and Parag A. Pathak. “How Individual Preferences are Aggregated in Groups: An Experimental Study.” Unsw Australian School of Business Research Paper, June 18, 2014.
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Ambrus, Attila, and Georgy Egorov. “Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, March 1, 2012.Open Access Copy
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Ambrus, A., E. J. Chaney, and I. Salitskiy. “Appendix for Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper, December 22, 2011.
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- Teaching & Mentoring
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Recent Courses
- ECON 620: Game Theory with Applications of Economics and other Social Sciences 2021
- ECON 390: Selected Topics in Economics 2020
- ECON 620: Game Theory with Applications of Economics and other Social Sciences 2020
- ECON 885: Special Topics in Economic Theory 2020
- ECON 620: Game Theory with Applications of Economics and other Social Sciences 2019
- ECON 799: Internship 2019
- ECON 885: Special Topics in Economic Theory 2019
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