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Giuseppe Lopomo

Alan D. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
Fuqua School of Business
Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120
A406 Fuq Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708

Overview


Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo is the Alan D. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Business Administrations at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He also has a courtesy appointment at the Economics Department of Duke University.

He has a Laurea Magna cum laude from Bocconi University in Milan, Italy, and a Ph.D. in Business Administration from the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business of New York University, and visited the Economics department of the University of Michigan for one year.

Currently, Professor Lopomo teaches Managerial Economics and Competitive Analysis to MBA students. He has taught courses on similar topics to undergraduate and PhD students.

Professor Lopomo's research focuses on applied game theory, auction and mechanism design. His work has been published in leading journals of economics including The Review of Economic Studies, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Rand Journal of Economics and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Current Appointments & Affiliations


Alan D. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Business Administration · 2021 - Present Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Business Administration · 2011 - Present Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Economics · 2011 - Present Economics, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

In the News


Published August 8, 2023
For Your Next Auction: Here's How to Set the Right Minimum Price to Get the Best Bids
Published June 28, 2021
Duke Awards 22 Distinguished Professorships

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Recent Publications


Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns

Journal Article American Economic Review · June 1, 2023 Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and social surplus, subject to inc ... Full text Cite

Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction

Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory · September 1, 2022 We study surplus extraction in the general environment of McAfee and Reny (1992), and provide two alternative proofs of their main theorem. The first is an analogue of the classic argument of Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988), using geometric features of the ... Full text Cite

Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction

Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory · January 1, 2022 This paper studies a robust version of the classic surplus extraction problem, in which the designer knows only that the beliefs of each type belong to some set, and designs mechanisms that are suitable for all possible beliefs in that set. We derive neces ... Full text Cite
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Recent Grants


Applied Mechanism Design

ResearchCo-Principal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2009 - 2011

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Education, Training & Certifications


Stanford University · 1994 Ph.D.
Bocconi University (Italy) · 1988 B.S.