Journal articleFrontiers of Philosophy in China · January 1, 2018
This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us ...
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Journal articleNeuroethics · April 1, 2017
There is a debate about the nature of addiction, whether it is a result of brain damage, brain dysfunction, or normal brain changes that result from habit acquisition, and about whether it is a disease. I argue that the debate about whether addiction is a ...
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Journal articleFrontiers in psychiatry · October 2013
Addiction is a person-level phenomenon that involves twin normative failures. A failure of normal rational effective agency or self-control with respect to the substance; and shame at both this failure, and the failure to live up to the standards for a goo ...
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Journal article · 2013
In this chapter I ask the question: Why are Buddhists and Confucians more tolerant, less conflict prone, less war-like, etc. than Abrahamic peoples IF THEY ARE?1 A proper analysis that positioned us to adequately answer this question would require defining ...
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Journal articleGrazer Philosophische Studien · January 1, 2012
There are two ways a person can experience or, what is dif erent, can think about herself: f rst, as a subject of experience who feels a certain characteristic way, the-way-it-feels-to-be-oneself; and, second, as the person who is the subject of a particul ...
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Journal articleAnnals of the New York Academy of Sciences · October 2011
Moderated by Steve Paulson, producer and interviewer for public radio's To the Best of Our Knowledge, philosopher and neurobiologist Owen Flanagan (Duke University), and psychologists Paul Bloom (Yale University) and Roy Baumeister (Florida State Universit ...
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Journal articleTopics in cognitive science · July 2010
Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in ter ...
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Journal articleBehavioral and Brain Sciences · December 1, 2009
McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily selected for misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that some of its members a ...
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Journal article · February 26, 2008
What is consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of cognition? Can consciousness be studied empirically? These are the questions. Here are the answers ...
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Journal articleMinds and Machines · February 1, 2001
The books 'consciouness' and 'consciouness and experience,' written by Lycan, were reviewed. According to the reviwers, the author has given some powerful ideas about how functionalism would work, and a whole armory of useful tools. These two books are an ...
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Journal articleBehavioral and Brain Sciences · December 1, 2000
The five papers in this issue all deal with the proper evolutionary function of sleep and dreams, these being different. To establish that some trait of character is an adaptation in the strict biological sense requires a story about the fitness enhancing ...
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Journal articleNeuropsychologia · September 1995
'Consciousness' is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous array of mental state types. The types share the property of 'being experienced' or 'being experiences'--'of there being something that it is like for the subject to be in one of these states.' I ...
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