Scholars@Duke

• Background
• 

  Education, Training, & Certifications

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001
• 

  Duke Appointment History

  • Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Computer Science, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences 2006 - 2011
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, Economics, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences 2006 - 2011
• Recognition
• 

  In the News

  • JUN 24, 2019

    Duke Research Blog

    Last Day to Comment for a Duke Project to Win a NSF Project on the Science of Consciousness

  • FEB 19, 2019

    Duke Experts Talk Artificial Intelligence With Congressional Staff

  • AUG 30, 2017

    The Workplace of the Future

  • MAY 17, 2017

    Duke in DC Panel Leads Conversation on Artificial Intelligence and Jobs

  • MAR 6, 2017

    A Cartoon and a Laugh: Professor Wins Weekly New Yorker Caption Contest

  • NOV 1, 2016

    MIT Technology Review

    Vince Conitzer: Todays Artificial Intelligence Does Not Justify A Basic Income

  • JUL 13, 2016

    U.S. News & World Report

    Pokemon Go: Collecting all the data?

  • JUL 7, 2016

    Futurism

    The evolution of AI: Can morality be programmed?

  • JUL 1, 2016

    TechRepublic

    AI expert Vincent Conitzer weighs in on Microsoft CEO's 10 new rules for artificial intelligence

  • MAY 9, 2016

    Prospect Magazine

    Vincent Conitzer: Artificial intelligence -- where’s the philosophical scrutiny?

  • MAY 1, 2015

    Duke Announces 2015 Distinguished Professors

  • JUN 17, 2014

    Society for Social Choice and Welfare

    Computer Science's Vincent Conitzer Receives Social Choice and Welfare Prize
• 

  Awards & Honors

  • Meritorious Prize Winner, NSF 2026 Idea Machine competition. National Science Foundation. 2020
  • Fellow. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 2019
  • Fellow. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). 2019
  • AAAI Outstanding Student Paper Honorable Mention (co-author). Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. 2018
  • First place, Cartoon Caption Contest. New Yorker. January 30, 2017
  • Blue Sky Award. Computing Community Consortium. 2017
  • Guggenheim Fellowship. John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. 2015
  • Social Choice and Welfare Prize. The Society for Social Choice and Welfare. 2014
  • AI's 10 to Watch. IEEE Intelligent Systems. 2011
  • Computers and Thought Award. IJCAI. 2011
  • Presidential Early Career Awards for Scientists and Engineers. President of the United States of America. 2011
  • Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) Program. National Science Foundation. 2010
  • NSF CAREER Award. NSF. 2010
  • AAAI Outstanding Paper Award. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. 2008
  • Sloan Research Fellowship-Computer Science. Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 2008
  • Honorable Mention for the ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award. ACM. 2007
  • Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. IFAAMAS. 2006
• Research
• 

  Selected Grants

  • RI: Small: Designing Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence awarded by  National Science Foundation 2018 - 2021
  • Google US/Canada PhD Fellowship in Market Algorithms - Deng awarded by Google Inc. 2018 - 2020
  • Explainability and Trade Secrecy in AI-Enabled Clinical Decision Support, Diagnostic, and Predictive Software awarded by Greenwall Foundation 2019 - 2020
  • RI: Small: New Directions in Computational Social Choice and Mechanism Design awarded by  National Science Foundation 2015 - 2019
  • XPS: CLCCA: Allocating Heterogeneous Datacenter Hardware to Strategic Agents awarded by  National Science Foundation 2013 - 2019
  • Realizing Cyber Inception: Towards a Science of Personalized Deception for Cyber Defense awarded by University of Southern California 2018
  • How to Build Ethics into Robust Artificial Intelligence awarded by Future of Life Institute 2015 - 2018
  • Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions for Security in the Medium Term awarded by Army Research Office 2012 - 2017
  • Game Theory for Adversarial Behavior awarded by University of Southern California 2011 - 2017
  • Mechanism Design for Highly Anonymous Environments awarded by  National Science Foundation 2011 - 2015
  • CAREER: New Directions in Computing Game Theoretic Solutions: Commitment and Related Topics awarded by  National Science Foundation 2010 - 2015
  • RI-Small: Computational Social Choice: Aggregating Preferences in Combinatorial Domains awarded by  National Science Foundation 2008 - 2012
  • Algorithms for Computing Stackelberg Strategies in Large, Realistic Games awarded by Army Research Office 2009 - 2011
  • Workshop on Reasoning in Adversarial and Noncooperative Environments awarded by Army Research Office 2010 - 2011
  • 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems awarded by  National Science Foundation 2010 - 2011
• 

  External Relationships

  • Avata Intelligence, Inc.
  • Econorithms, LLC
  • Facebook Coporation
• Publications & Artistic Works
• 

  Selected Publications

  • Books

    • Brandt, F., V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia. Handbook of computational social choice, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107446984.
       Full Text

  • Academic Articles

    • Kolb, A., and V. Conitzer. “Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning.” Journal of Economic Theory 189 (September 1, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105094.
       Full Text
    • Freedman, R., J. S. Borg, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. P. Dickerson, and V. Conitzer. “Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values.” Artificial Intelligence 283 (June 1, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261.
       Full Text
    • Chan, L., K. Doyle, D. C. McElfresh, V. Conitzer, J. P. Dickerson, J. S. Borg, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “Artificial artificial intelligence: Measuring influence of AI 'Assessments' on moral decision-making.” Aies 2020  Proceedings of the Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society, February 7, 2020, 214–20. https://doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375870.
       Full Text
    • Skorburg, Joshua August, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Vincent Conitzer. “AI Methods in Bioethics.” Ajob Empirical Bioethics 11, no. 1 (January 2020): 37–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “A Puzzle about Further Facts.” Erkenntnis 84, no. 3 (June 15, 2019): 727–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies.” Mathematics of Operations Research 44, no. 3 (January 1, 2019): 783–92. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0945.
       Full Text
    • Ueda, S., A. Iwasaki, V. Conitzer, N. Ohta, Y. Sakurai, and M. Yokoo. “Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations.” Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems 32, no. 4 (July 1, 2018): 503–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-018-9386-z.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Technical perspective designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy.” Communications of the Acm 61, no. 2 (February 1, 2018): 92. https://doi.org/10.1145/3166066.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and P. Mcafee. “Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future.” Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation 5, no. 2 (May 1, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3079047.
       Full Text
    • Aziz, H., M. Brill, V. Conitzer, E. Elkind, R. Freeman, and T. Walsh. “Justified representation in approval-based committee voting.” Social Choice and Welfare 48, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 461–85. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and D. Easley. “Introduction to the special issue on EC'14.” Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation 4, no. 4 (August 1, 2016). https://doi.org/10.1145/2953046.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “On Stackelberg mixed strategies.” Synthese 193, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 689–703. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0927-6.
       Full Text
    • Jakobsen, S. K., T. B. Sørensen, and V. Conitzer. “Timeability of extensive-form games.” Itcs 2016  Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, January 14, 2016, 191–99. https://doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840737.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence.” Corr abs/1605.06048 (2016).
    • Li, Y., V. Conitzer, and D. Korzhyk. “Catcher-evader games.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2016-January (January 1, 2016): 329–37.
    • Conitzer, V. “Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs?” Synthese 192, no. 12 (December 1, 2015): 4107–19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0737-x.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists.” Synthese 192, no. 9 (October 1, 2015): 2887–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0691-7.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “A devastating example for the Halfer Rule.” Philosophical Studies 172, no. 8 (September 23, 2015): 1985–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0384-y.
       Full Text
    • Aziz, H., M. Brill, V. Conitzer, E. Elkind, R. Freeman, and T. Walsh. “Justified representation in approval-based committee voting.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (June 1, 2015): 784–90.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and David Easley. “Notes from the EC'14 program chairs.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 13, no. 1 (November 25, 2014): 2–4. https://doi.org/10.1145/2692375.2692377.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., D. Easley, and M. Babaioff. “EC'14 foreword.” Ec 2014  Proceedings of the 15th Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, January 1, 2014.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Mechanism Design.” Corr abs/1408.1486 (2014).
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries.” Corr abs/1401.3449 (2014).
    • De Weerdt, M. M., P. Harrenstein, and V. Conitzer. “Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties.” Games and Economic Behavior 86 (January 1, 2014): 405–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001.
       Full Text
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions.” Artificial Intelligence 216 (January 1, 2014): 287–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006.
       Full Text
    • Korzhyk, Dmytro, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, and Milind Tambe. “Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness.” Corr abs/1401.3888 (2014).
    • Letchford, J., D. Korzhyk, and V. Conitzer. “On the value of commitment.” Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems 28, no. 6 (January 1, 2014): 986–1016. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9246-9.
       Full Text
    • Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives.” International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, 1–20.
    • Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives.” International Journal of Game Theory 43, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 599–618. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3.
       Full Text
    • Xia, Lirong, and Vincent Conitzer. “Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders.” Corr abs/1401.3876 (2014).
    • Conitzer, V. “The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 8289 LNCS (December 1, 2013): 96–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_9.
       Full Text
    • Li, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Game-theoretic question selection for tests.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2013, 254–62.
    • Conitzer, V. “The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks.” 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013, January 1, 2013, 1482–87. https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736702.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and R. P. Mcafee. “The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction.” Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2013). https://doi.org/10.1145/2399187.2399188.
       Full Text
    • Guo, M., E. Markakis, K. R. Apt, and V. Conitzer. “Undominated groves mechanisms.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 46 (January 1, 2013): 129–63. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.3810.
       Full Text
    • Guo, Mingyu, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt, and Vincent Conitzer. “Undominated Groves Mechanisms.” J. Artif. Intell. Res. 46 (2013): 129–63.
    • Letchford, J., D. Korzhyk, and V. Conitzer. “On the value of commitment.” Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, 2013, 1–31.
    • Weerdt, M. M. de, P. Harrenstein, and V. Conitzer. “Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2013.
    • Bhattacharya, S., D. Korzhyk, and V. Conitzer. “Computing a profit-maximizing sequence of offers to agents in a social network.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 7695 LNCS (December 26, 2012): 482–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_36.
       Full Text
    • Letchford, Joshua, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, and Charles L. Isbell. “Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 11, no. 2 (December 2012): 36–40. https://doi.org/10.1145/2509002.2509011.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “An undergraduate course in the intersection of computer science and economics.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3 (November 7, 2012): 2357–62.
    • Conitzer, V. “Computing game-theoretic solutions and applications to security.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3 (November 7, 2012): 2106–12.
    • Letchford, J., L. MacDermed, V. Conitzer, R. Parr, and C. L. Isbell. “Computing optimal strategies to commit to in stochastic games.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 7, 2012): 1380–86.
    • Waggoner, B., L. Xia, and V. Conitzer. “Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in elections.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 7, 2012): 1485–91.
    • Conitzer, V. “Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?” Mathematical Social Sciences 64, no. 1 (July 1, 2012): 100–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.006.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., C. R. Taylor, and L. Wagman. “Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market with repeat purchases.” Marketing Science 31, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 277–92. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1110.0691.
       Full Text
    • Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition.” International Journal of Game Theory 41, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 91–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0275-9.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities.” Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 2–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009.
       Full Text
    • Guo, Mingyu, and Vincent Conitzer. “False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal.” Corr abs/1208.6501 (2012).
    • Guo, M., V. Naroditskiy, V. Conitzer, A. Greenwald, and N. R. Jennings. “Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: Public goods and beyond.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 7090 LNCS (December 12, 2011): 158–69. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-14.
       Full Text
    • Zuckerman, M., P. Faliszewski, V. Conitzer, and J. S. Rosenschein. “An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 7090 LNCS (December 12, 2011): 363–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-31.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Discussion of "a conditional game for comparing approximations".” Journal of Machine Learning Research 15 (December 1, 2011): 72–73.
    • Conitzer, V., T. Walsh, and L. Xia. “Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (November 2, 2011): 638–43.
    • Conitzer, V., and D. Korzhyk. “Commitment to correlated strategies.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (November 2, 2011): 632–37.
    • Wagman, Liad, Vincent Conitzer, and Curtis R. Taylor. “Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases,” October 15, 2011.
    • Naoki, O., C. Vincent, I. Ryo, S. Yuko, I. Atsushi, and Y. Makoto. “Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations.” Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 26, no. 3 (May 19, 2011): 451–60. https://doi.org/10.1527/tjsai.26.451.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Expressive markets for donating to charities.” Artificial Intelligence 175, no. 7–8 (May 1, 2011): 1251–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007.
       Full Text
    • Korzhyk, D., Z. Yin, C. Kiekintveld, V. Conitzer, and M. Tambe. “Stackelberg vs. nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 41 (May 1, 2011): 297–327. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.3269.
       Full Text
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 41 (May 1, 2011): 25–67. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.3186.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “AI and Economic Theory.” Ieee Intelligent Systems 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 7–7.
       Link to Item
    • Farfel, J., and V. Conitzer. “Aggregating value ranges: Preference elicitation and truthfulness.” Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 127–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-009-9118-5.
       Full Text
    • Jain, M., D. Korzhyk, O. Vaněk, V. Conitzer, M. Pěchouček, and M. Tambe. “A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs.” 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, Aamas 2011 1 (January 1, 2011): 305–12.
    • Korzhyk, D., V. Conitzer, and R. Parr. “Solving stackelberg games with uncertain observability.” 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, Aamas 2011 2 (January 1, 2011): 953–60.
    • Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. “Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, January 1, 2011, 179–88. https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993602.
       Full Text
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 6484 LNCS (December 1, 2010): 402–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_33.
       Full Text
    • Letchford, J., and V. Conitzer. “Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, July 23, 2010, 83–92. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807354.
       Full Text
    • Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and A. D. Procaccia. “A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, July 23, 2010, 275–84. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807386.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 9, no. 1 (June 2010): 1–2. https://doi.org/10.1145/1980534.1980543.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting.” Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 58, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 239–59. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y.
       Full Text
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.” Artificial Intelligence 174, no. 5–6 (April 1, 2010): 363–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.12.003.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents.” Communications of the Acm 53, no. 3 (March 1, 2010): 84–94. https://doi.org/10.1145/1666420.1666442.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Using a memory test to limit a user to one account.” Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing 44 LNBIP (January 1, 2010): 60–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_5.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and M. Yokoo. “Using mechanism design to prevent false-name manipulations.” Ai Magazine 31, no. 4 (January 1, 2010): 65–77. https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315.
       Full Text
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3 (January 1, 2010): 1676–79.
    • Korzhyk, D., V. Conitzer, and R. Parr. “Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (January 1, 2010): 805–10.
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (January 1, 2010): 921–26.
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Compilation complexity of common voting rules.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (January 1, 2010): 915–20.
    • Conitzer, V. “Approximation guarantees for fictitious play.” 2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009, December 1, 2009, 636–43. https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394918.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 8, no. 2 (December 2009): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1145/1980522.1980532.
       Full Text
    • Guo, M., V. Conitzer, and D. M. Reeves. “Competitive repeated allocation without payments.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5929 LNCS (December 1, 2009): 244–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_23.
       Full Text
    • Harrenstein, B. P., M. M. De Weerdt, and V. Conitzer. “A qualitative Vickrey auction.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2009, 197–206. https://doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566403.
       Full Text
    • Ohta, N., Y. Sato, A. Iwasaki, M. Yokoo, and V. Conitzer. “Anonymity-proof shapley value: Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment.” Computer Software 26, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 181–96.
    • Shi, P., V. Conitzer, and M. Guo. “Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5929 LNCS (December 1, 2009): 89–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_10.
       Full Text
    • Ohta, N., V. Conitzer, R. Ichimura, Y. Sakurai, A. Iwasaki, and M. Yokoo. “Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5732 LNCS (November 2, 2009): 623–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04244-7_49.
       Full Text
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions.” Games and Economic Behavior 67, no. 1 (September 1, 2009): 69–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.007.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent, Curtis R. Taylor, and Liad Wagman. “Who Benefits from Online Privacy?,” August 15, 2009.
       Open Access Copy
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 8, no. 1 (July 2009): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1145/1598780.1598792.
       Full Text
    • Anand, S. S., R. Bunescu, V. Carvcdho, J. Chomicki, V. Conitzer, M. T. Cox, V. Dignum, et al. “AAAI 2008 workshop reports.” Ai Magazine 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 108–18. https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2196.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game theory.” Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Uai 2009, January 1, 2009, 101–8.
    • Conitzer, V. “Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 35 (January 1, 2009): 161–91. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2606.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., J. Lang, and L. Xia. “How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 1, 2009, 103–8.
    • Conitzer, V., M. Rognlie, and L. Xia. “Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 1, 2009, 109–15.
    • Farfel, J., and V. Conitzer. “A multiagent turing test based on a prediction market.” Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2 (January 1, 2009): 1435–36.
    • Halvorson, E., V. Conitzer, and R. Parr. “Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 1, 2009, 159–66.
    • Xia, L., M. Zuckerman, A. D. Procaccia, V. Conitzer, and J. S. Rosenschein. “Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 1, 2009, 348–53.
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 1, 2009, 336–41.
    • Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 29, 2008): 190–95.
    • Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. “Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 24, 2008): 202–7.
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 24, 2008): 196–201.
    • Apt, K., V. Conitzer, M. Guo, and E. Markakis. “Welfare undominated groves mechanisms.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 426–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48.
       Full Text
    • Chomicki, J., V. Conitzer, U. Junkar, and P. Pern. “AAAI Workshop - Technical Report: Preface.” Aaai Workshop  Technical Report WS-08-09 (December 1, 2008).
    • Conitzer, V. “Metareasoning as a formal computational problem.” Aaai Workshop  Technical Report WS-08-07 (December 1, 2008): 29–33.
    • Conitzer, V. “Anonymity-proof voting rules.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 295–306. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_36.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting.” 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2008, December 1, 2008.
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 210–19. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386825.
       Full Text
    • Letchford, J., V. Conitzer, and K. Jain. “An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player perfect-information games.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 696–707. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_75.
       Full Text
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 99–108. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386810.
       Full Text
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 109–18. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386811.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 7, no. 3 (November 2008): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1145/1486877.1486889.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “New complexity results about Nash equilibria.” Games and Economic Behavior 63, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 621–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.015.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 7, no. 2 (June 2008): 1–2. https://doi.org/10.1145/1399589.1399602.
       Full Text
    • Apaydin, Mehmet Serkan, Vincent Conitzer, and Bruce Randall Donald. “Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles.” J Biomol Nmr 40, no. 4 (April 2008): 263–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10858-008-9230-x.
       Full Text  Link to Item
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.” Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2 (January 1, 2008): 1021–28.
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.” Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2 (January 1, 2008): 1029–36.
    • Ohta, N., V. Conitzer, Y. Satoh, A. Iwasaki, and M. Yokoo. “Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for coalitional games in open environments.” Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2 (January 1, 2008): 909–16.
    • Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “Strategie betting for competitive agents.” Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2 (January 1, 2008): 829–36.
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments.” Ec’07  Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 3, 2007, 30–39. https://doi.org/10.1145/1250910.1250915.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries.” Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, December 1, 2007, 420–27. https://doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329204.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 7, no. 1 (December 2007): 69–70. https://doi.org/10.1145/1345037.1345055.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. “When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate.” Journal of the Acm 54, no. 3 (June 1, 2007). https://doi.org/10.1145/1236457.1236461.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.” Machine Learning 67, no. 1–2 (May 1, 2007): 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-006-0143-1.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and N. Garera. “Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).” Acm International Conference Proceeding Series 148 (December 1, 2006): 209–16. https://doi.org/10.1145/1143844.1143871.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a nash equilibrium.” Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents 2006 (December 1, 2006): 537–44. https://doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160731.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.” Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents 2006 (December 1, 2006): 521–28. https://doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160729.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (November 13, 2006): 613–19.
    • Conitzer, V., A. Davenport, and J. Kalagitanam. “Improved bounds for computing kemeny rankings.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (November 13, 2006): 620–26.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (November 13, 2006): 627–34.
    • Ohta, N., A. Iwasaki, M. Yokoo, K. Maruono, V. Conitzer, and T. Sandholm. “A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (November 13, 2006): 697–702.
    • Conitzer, V., and N. Garera. “Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).” Icml 2006  Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning 2006 (October 6, 2006): 209–16.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.” Artificial Intelligence 170, no. 6–7 (May 1, 2006): 607–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2006.01.005.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006 (January 1, 2006): 82–90. https://doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134717.
       Full Text
    • Yokoo, M., V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, N. Ohta, and A. Iwasaki. “A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 4012 LNAI (January 1, 2006): 53–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_6.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V. “Computational aspects of mechanism design.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 4 (December 1, 2005): 1642–43.
    • Conitzer, V., T. Sandholm, and P. Santi. “Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 1, 2005): 248–54.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators.” Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Uai 2005, December 1, 2005, 145–52.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 3435 LNAI (December 1, 2005): 1–14.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Communication complexity of common voting rules.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2005, 78–87. https://doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064018.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 1, 2005): 255–60.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of (iterated) dominance.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2005, 88–97. https://doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064019.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “A generalized strategy eliminability criterion and computational methods for applying it.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (December 1, 2005): 483–88.
    • Sandholm, T., A. Gilpin, and V. Conitzer. “Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (December 1, 2005): 495–501.
    • Yokoot, M., V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, N. Ohta, and A. Iwasaki. “Coalitional games in open anonymous environments.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (December 1, 2005): 509–14.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Computing shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 13, 2004, 219–25.
    • Conitzer, V., J. Derryberry, and T. Sandholm. “Combinatorial auctions with structured item graphs.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 9, 2004, 212–18.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.” Proceedings, Twenty First International Conference on Machine Learning, Icml 2004, December 1, 2004, 185–92.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments.” Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2004 1 (September 27, 2004): 128–35.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (January 1, 2004): 266–67. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988826.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (January 1, 2004): 132–41. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988793.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (January 1, 2004): 51–60. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988781.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (January 1, 2004): 262–63. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988824.
       Full Text
    • Santi, P., V. Conitzer, and T. Sandholm. “Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions.” Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science) 3120 (January 1, 2004): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27819-1_1.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (December 1, 2003): 17–24.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.” Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning 1 (December 1, 2003): 83–90.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.” Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning 1 (December 1, 2003): 91–98.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2003, 613–18.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting.” Acm International Conference Proceeding Series 50 (December 1, 2003): 17–24. https://doi.org/10.1145/948005.948008.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity results about Nash equilibria.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2003, 765–71.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2003, 1099–1106.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2003, 781–88.
    • Conitzer, V., J. Lang, and T. Sandholm. “How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?” Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Tark 2003, June 20, 2003, 201–14. https://doi.org/10.1145/846241.846268.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, January 1, 2003, 232–33. https://doi.org/10.1145/779950.779974.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2002, 314–19.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 1, 2002, 392–97.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.” Corr cs.GT/0205074 (2002).
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Mechanism Design.” Corr cs.GT/0205075 (2002).
    • Campbell, J. Y., and A. Melino. “Editors' introduction.” Journal of Econometrics 45, no. 1–2 (January 1, 1990): 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(90)90091-7.
       Full Text
    • Lewin, A. Y., and C. A. Knox Lovell. “Editor's introduction.” Journal of Econometrics 46, no. 1–2 (January 1, 1990): 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(90)90044-T.
       Full Text

  • Book Sections

    • Brandt, F., V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia. “Introduction to computational social choice.” In Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 1–20, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107446984.002.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Walsh. “Barriers to manipulation in voting.” In Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 127–45, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107446984.007.
       Full Text
    • Yin, Z., D. Korzhyk, C. Kiekintveld, V. Conitzer, and M. Tambe. “Stackelberg versus nash in security games: Interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness.” In Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned, 9781107096424:233–53, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511973031.012.
       Full Text

  • Other Articles

    • Sosa, J. A., and P. Romero. “Editorial Introductions.” Current Opinion in Oncology, January 1, 2009.

  • Scholarly Editions

    • Taylor, Curtis R., Vincent Conitzer, and Liad Wagman. “Online Privacy and Price Discrimination,” July 2010.

  • Conference Papers

    • Zhang, H., and V. Conitzer. “Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching.” In Ec 2020  Proceedings of the 21st Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, 879–910, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399470.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., Y. Deng, and S. Dughmi. “Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 12495 LNCS:444–58, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_31.
       Full Text
    • Oesterheld, C., and V. Conitzer. “Extracting money from causal decision theorists.” In Ceur Workshop Proceedings, Vol. 2640, 2020.
    • Oesterheld, C., and V. Conitzer. “Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 12495 LNCS:430–43, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_30.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicolas E. Stier-Moses, and Chris Wilkens. “Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets.” In Proceedings of the 2019 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329600.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., G. Hadfield, and S. Vallor. “AIES 2019 program chairs' welcome.” In Aies 2019  Proceedings of the 2019 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society, III–IV, 2019.
    • Conitzer, V. “Designing preferences, beliefs, and identities for artificial intelligence.” In 33rd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, Iaai 2019 and the 9th Aaai Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Eaai 2019, 9755–59, 2019.
    • Conitzer, V., R. Freeman, N. Shah, and J. W. Vaughan. “Group fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods.” In 33rd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, Iaai 2019 and the 9th Aaai Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Eaai 2019, 1853–60, 2019.
    • Zhang, H., Y. Cheng, and V. Conitzer. “A better algorithm for societal tradeoffs.” In 33rd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, Iaai 2019 and the 9th Aaai Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Eaai 2019, 2229–36, 2019.
    • Zhang, H., Y. Cheng, and V. Conitzer. “Distinguishing distributions when samples are strategically transformed.” In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, Vol. 32, 2019.
    • Zhang, H., and V. Conitzer. “A PAC framework for aggregating agents' judgments.” In 33rd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, Iaai 2019 and the 9th Aaai Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Eaai 2019, 2237–44, 2019.
    • Freedman, Rachel, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, and Vincent Conitzer. “Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values.” In Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society. ACM, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278727.
       Full Text
    • Kramer, M. F., J. Schaich Borg, V. Conitzer, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?” In Aies 2018  Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society, 204–9, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752.
       Full Text
    • Freeman, R., S. M. Zahedi, V. Conitzer, and B. C. Lee. “Dynamic Proportional Sharing.” In Performance Evaluation Review, 46:33–35, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3219617.3219631.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2018, 2018.
    • De Weerdt, M. M., V. Conitzer, M. Albert, and K. Van Der Linden. “Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 3:1924–26, 2018.
    • De Weerdt, M., M. Albert, V. Conitzer, and K. Van Der Linden. “Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018-July:4736–42, 2018. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/658.
       Full Text
    • Deng, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Disarmament games with resources.” In 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018, 981–88, 2018.
    • Freedman, R., J. P. Dickerson, J. S. Borg, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, and V. Conitzer. “Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values.” In 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018, 1636–43, 2018.
    • Conitzer, V., R. Freeman, and N. Shah. “Fair public decision making.” In Ec 2017  Proceedings of the 2017 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, 629–46, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085125.
       Full Text
    • Li, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Game-theoretic question selection for tests.” In Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 59:437–62, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.5413.
       Full Text  Open Access Copy
    • Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and P. Stone. “Automated design of robust mechanisms.” In 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017, 298–304, 2017.
    • Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and P. Stone. “Mechanism design with unknown correlated distributions: Can we learn optimal mechanisms?” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:69–77, 2017.
    • Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017, 4831–35, 2017.
    • Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In Aaai Workshop  Technical Report, WS-17-01-WS-17-15:105–9, 2017.
    • Deng, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Disarmament games.” In 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017, 473–79, 2017.
    • Freeman, R., S. M. Zahedi, and V. Conitzer. “Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic settings.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 0:4580–87, 2017. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/639.
       Full Text
    • Bergemann, D., Y. Chen, and V. Conitzer. “EC 2016 foreword.” In Ec 2016  Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, iii–iv, 2016.
    • Kephart, A., and V. Conitzer. “The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting costs.” In Ec 2016  Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, 85–102, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940795.
       Full Text
    • Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and G. Lopomo. “Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility.” In 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016, 376–82, 2016.
    • Albert, Michael, Vincent Conitzer, and Giuseppe Lopomo. “Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility.” In Aaai, edited by Dale Schuurmans and Michael P. Wellman, 383–89. AAAI Press, 2016.
    • Andersen, G., and V. Conitzer. “ATUCAPTS: Automated tests that a user cannot pass twice simultaneously.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016-January:3662–69, 2016.
    • Brill, M., R. Freeman, and V. Conitzer. “Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan setwinners).” In 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016, 418–24, 2016.
    • Brill, M., R. Freeman, and V. Conitzer. “Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners).” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.
    • Brill, M., R. Freeman, and V. Conitzer. “Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners).” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.
    • Brill, M., V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, and N. Shah. “False-name-proof recommendations in social networks.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 332–40, 2016.
    • Brill, M., V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, and N. Shah. “False-name-proof recommendations in social networks.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.
    • Brill, M., V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, and N. Shah. “False-name-proof recommendations in social networks.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.
    • Conitzer, V. “Computing equilibria with partial commitment.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 10123 LNCS:1–14, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_1.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., R. Freeman, M. Brill, and Y. Li. “Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs.” In 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016, 460–67, 2016.
    • Conitzer, V., R. Freeman, M. Brill, and Y. Li. “Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.
    • Conitzer, V., R. Freeman, M. Brill, and Y. Li. “Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.
    • Jakobsen, Sune K., Troels Bjerre Sørensen, and Vincent Conitzer. “Timeability of Extensive-Form Games.” In Itcs, edited by Madhu Sudan, 191–99. ACM, 2016.
    • Moon, C., and V. Conitzer. “Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016-January:416–23, 2016.
    • Moon, C., and V. Conitzer. “Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1413–14, 2016.
    • Moon, Catherine, and Vincent Conitzer. “Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract).” In Aamas, edited by Catholijn M. Jonker, Stacy Marsella, John Thangarajah, and Karl Tuyls, 1413–14. ACM, 2016.
    • Xu, H., R. Freeman, V. Conitzer, S. Dughmi, and M. Tambe. “Signaling in Bayesian stackelberg games.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 150–58, 2016.
    • Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and G. Lopomo. “Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:763–69, 2015.
    • Brill, M., and V. Conitzer. “Strategic voting and strategic candidacy.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:819–26, 2015.
    • Li, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Cooperative game solution concepts that maximize stability under noise.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:979–85, 2015.
    • Conitzer, V., M. Brill, and R. Freeman. “Crowdsourcing societal tradeoffs.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 2:1213–17, 2015.
    • Freeman, R., M. Brill, and V. Conitzer. “General tiebreaking schemes for computational social choice.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 3:1401–9, 2015.
    • Kephart, A., and V. Conitzer. “Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:357–65, 2015.
    • Moon, C., and V. Conitzer. “Maximal cooperation in repeated games on social networks.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015-January:216–23, 2015.
    • Babaioff, Moshe, Vincent Conitzer, and David A. Easley, eds. “ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014.” In Ec. ACM, 2014.
    • Conitzer, V. “The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2014, 2014.
    • Conitzer, V. “The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2014, 2014.
    • Conitzer, V., and A. Vidali. “Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution time.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1:623–29, 2014.
    • Freeman, R., M. Brill, and V. Conitzer. “On the axiomatic characterization of runoff voting rules.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1:675–81, 2014.
    • Li, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games.” In 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2014, 1:581–88, 2014.
    • Sørensen, T. B., M. Dalis, J. Letchford, D. Korzhyk, and V. Conitzer. “Beat the cheater: Computing game-theoretic strategies for when to kick a gambler out of a casino.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1:798–804, 2014.
    • Xu, H., F. Fang, A. X. Jiang, V. Conitzer, S. Dughmi, and M. Tambe. “Solving zero-sum security games in discretized spatio-temporal domains.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:1500–1506, 2014.
    • Andersen, G., and V. Conitzer. “Fast equilibrium computation for infinitely repeated games.” In Proceedings of the 27th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2013, 53–59, 2013.
    • Letchford, J., and V. Conitzer. “Solving security games on graphs via marginal probabilities.” In Proceedings of the 27th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2013, 591–97, 2013.
    • Jain, M., V. Conitzer, and M. Tambe. “Security scheduling for real-world networks.” In 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, 1:215–22, 2013.
    • Li, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Optimal Internet auctions with costly communication.” In 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, 1:683–90, 2013.
    • Todo, T., and V. Conitzer. “False-name-proof matching.” In 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, 1:311–18, 2013.
    • Conitzer, V., and L. Xia. “Approximating common voting rules by sequential voting in multi-issue domains.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2012, 2012.
    • Conitzer, V., and L. Xia. “Paradoxes of multiple elections: An approximation approach.” In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Temporal Representation and Reasoning, 179–87, 2012.
    • Bhattacharya, S., V. Conitzer, and K. Munagala. “Approximation algorithm for security games with costly resources.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 7090 LNCS:13–24, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-2.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., J. Lang, and L. Xia. “Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue domains.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 158–63, 2011. https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-038.
       Full Text
    • Korzhyk, D., V. Conitzer, and R. Parr. “Security games with multiple attacker resources.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 273–79, 2011. https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-056.
       Full Text
    • Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 446–51, 2011. https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-082.
       Full Text
    • Jain, Manish, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, and Milind Tambe. “A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs.” In Aamas, edited by Liz Sonenberg, Peter Stone, Kagan Tumer, and Pinar Yolum, 327–34. IFAAMAS, 2011.
    • Conitzer, V., N. Immorlica, J. Letchford, K. Munagala, and L. Wagman. “False-name-proofness in social networks.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 6484 LNCS:209–21, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_17.
       Full Text
    • Bhattacharya, S., V. Conitzer, K. Munagala, and L. Xia. “Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions.” In Proceedings of the Annual Acm Siam Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 554–72, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973075.47.
       Full Text
    • Bhattacharya, Sayan, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, and Lirong Xia. “Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions.” In Soda, edited by Moses Charikar, 554–72. SIAM, 2010.
    • Brandt, Felix, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker, eds. “Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010.” In Computational Foundations of Social Choice, Vol. 10101. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany, 2010.
    • Brandt, Felix, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. “10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice.” In Computational Foundations of Social Choice, edited by Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker, Vol. 10101. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany, 2010.
    • Brandt, Felix, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. “10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice.” In Computational Foundations of Social Choice, edited by Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker, Vol. 10101. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany, 2010.
    • Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 2:881–88, 2010.
    • Guo, Mingyu, and Vincent Conitzer. “False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal.” In Aamas, edited by Wiebe van der Hoek, Gal A. Kaminka, Yves Lespérance, Michael Luck, and Sandip Sen, 1475–76. IFAAMAS, 2010.
    • Iwasaki, A., V. Conitzer, Y. Omori, Y. Sakurai, T. Todo, M. Guo, and M. Yokoo. “Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:633–40, 2010.
    • Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. “Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:399–406, 2010.
    • Yin, Z., D. Korzhyk, C. Kiekintveld, V. Conitzer, and M. Tambe. “Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: Interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 2:1139–46, 2010.
    • Letchford, J., V. Conitzer, and K. Munagala. “Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 5814 LNCS:250–62, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23.
       Full Text
    • Farfel, J., and V. Conitzer. “A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market.” In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 14 LNICST:61–73, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_10.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory.” In Uai, edited by Jeff A. Bilmes and Andrew Y. Ng, 101–8. AUAI Press, 2009.
    • Farfel, Joseph, and Vincent Conitzer. “A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market.” In Aamas (2), edited by Carles Sierra, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Keith S. Decker, and Jaime Simão Sichman, 1407–8. IFAAMAS, 2009.
    • Apt, Krzysztof R., Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, and Evangelos Markakis. “Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.” In Wine, edited by Christos H. Papadimitriou and Shuzhong Zhang, 5385:426–37. Springer, 2008.
    • Guo, Mingyu, and Vincent Conitzer. “Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.” In Aamas (2), edited by Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, and Simon Parsons, 1047–54. IFAAMAS, 2008.
    • Guo, Mingyu, and Vincent Conitzer. “Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.” In Aamas (2), edited by Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, and Simon Parsons, 1039–46. IFAAMAS, 2008.
    • Ohta, Naoki, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. “Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments.” In Aamas (2), edited by Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, and Simon Parsons, 927–34. IFAAMAS, 2008.
    • Wagman, Liad, and Vincent Conitzer. “Strategic betting for competitive agents.” In Aamas (2), edited by Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, and Simon Parsons, 847–54. IFAAMAS, 2008.
    • Conitzer, V. “Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness.” In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Tark 2007, 102–11, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1324249.1324265.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Incremental mechanism design.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1251–56, 2007.
    • Sandholm, T., V. Conitzer, and C. Boutilier. “Automated design of multistage mechanisms.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1500–1506, 2007.
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness.” In Computational Social Systems and the Internet, edited by Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Éva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz, Vol. 07271. Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, 2007.
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.” In Computational Social Systems and the Internet, edited by Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Éva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz, Vol. 07271. Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, 2007.
    • Conitzer, Vincent. “Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award.” In Aamas, edited by Edmund H. Durfee, Makoto Yokoo, Michael N. Huhns, and Onn Shehory, 253–253. IFAAMAS, 2007.
    • Yokoo, M., V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, N. Ohta, and A. Iwasaki. “Coalitional games in open anonymous environments.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1668–69, 2005.
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.” In Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, 230–31, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1145/779950.779973.
       Full Text
    • Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 613–18, 2003.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, Jérôme Lang, and Tuomas Sandholm. “How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?” In Tark, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern and Moshe Tennenholtz, 201–14. ACM, 2003.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.” In Icml, edited by Tom Fawcett and Nina Mishra, 83–90. AAAI Press, 2003.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.” In Icml, edited by Tom Fawcett and Nina Mishra, 91–98. AAAI Press, 2003.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.” In Ijcai, edited by Georg Gottlob and Toby Walsh, 1099–1106. Morgan Kaufmann, 2003.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.” In Ijcai, edited by Georg Gottlob and Toby Walsh, 781–88. Morgan Kaufmann, 2003.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.” In Aaai/Iaai, edited by Rina Dechter, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard S. Sutton, 392–97. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2002.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.” In Aaai/Iaai, edited by Rina Dechter, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard S. Sutton, 314–19. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2002.
    • Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Mechanism Design.” In Uai, edited by Adnan Darwiche and Nir Friedman, 103–10. Morgan Kaufmann, 2002.
• Teaching & Mentoring
• 

  Recent Courses

  • COMPSCI 323D: Computational Microeconomics 2020
  • COMPSCI 590: Advanced Topics in Computer Science 2020
  • ECON 336D: Computational Microeconomics 2020
  • PHIL 590S: Special Fields of Philosophy Seminar (Topics) 2020
  • COMPSCI 270: Introduction to Artificial Intelligence 2019
  • PHIL 590S: Special Fields of Philosophy Seminar (Topics) 2019
• Scholarly, Clinical, & Service Activities
• 

  Outreach & Engaged Scholarship

  • Bass Connections Team Leader. How to Build Ethics into Artificial Intelligence. 2020 - 2021  2020 - 2021
  • Bass Connections Team Leader. How to Build Ethics into Robust Artificial Intelligence. 2019 - 2020  2019 - 2020
  • Bass Connections Faculty Team Leader. Moral Artificial Intelligence. 2018 - 2019  2018 - 2019
  • Bass Connections Faculty Team Member. How to Build Ethics into Robust Artificial Intelligence. August 2017 - May 2018  2017 - 2018

Some information on this profile has been compiled automatically from Duke databases and external sources. (Our About page explains how this works.) If you see a problem with the information, please write to Scholars@Duke and let us know. We will reply promptly.