Book section · January 1, 2021
Philosophers often argue about whether fetuses, animals, or AI systems do or do not have moral status. We will suggest instead that different entities have different degrees of moral status with respect to different moral reasons in different circumstances ...
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Book section · January 16, 2020
Case reports about patients undergoing deep brain stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric disorders-including Parkinson's disease, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and treatment resistant depression-have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics. ...
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Book section · January 1, 2018
In Chapter 4, the authors explore whether neuroscience undermines morality. The authors distinguish, analyze, and assess the main arguments for neuroscientific skepticism about morality and argue that neuroscience does not undermine all of our moral judgme ...
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Book section · January 1, 2008
This chapter argues that although Bush's preventive war in Iraq is morally wrong, and his policy is too broad, some exceptional preventive wars can still be morally justified. It develops and defends a version of consequentialism about war. It then critici ...
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Book section · September 1, 2007
This chapter argues that Audi's views on moral intuitions, specifically concerning whether they can be justified without being based on inference, raise a number of questions Audi has yet to address. First, it asks, can moral intuitions be justified withou ...
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Book section · May 1, 2006
This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which ...
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Book section · January 26, 2006
This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs require justifying beliefs to ...
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https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2579-9966
