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Xu Jiang

Associate Professor of Business Administration
Fuqua School of Business

Overview


Xu Jiang, PhD, Associate Professor of Business Administration; BA (University of Science and Technology of China), PhD (University of Minnesota).

Professor Jiang joined Fuqua faculty after serving as an assistant professor of accounting at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business. Professor Jiang’s research is in the area of theoretical models in disclosure and economic consequences of accounting standards. His current work focuses on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism and fair value accounting. He teaches financial accounting.

Current Appointments & Affiliations


Associate Professor of Business Administration · 2021 - Present Fuqua School of Business

In the News


Published February 28, 2023
Why Boards Should Go Along With ‘Visionary’ CEOs’ plans
Published March 25, 2021
If There’s a Right Time to Ban Short Selling, It’s During a Crisis

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Recent Publications


Firm value and market liquidity around the adoption of common accounting standards

Journal Article Journal of Accounting and Economics · August 1, 2019 The adoption of common accounting standards generates both a precision effect and a network effect. When firms use common standards, investors can leverage their knowledge about the standards to process more financial reports. Embedding both effects into t ... Full text Cite

Reporting choices in the shadow of bank runs

Journal Article Journal of Accounting and Economics · February 1, 2018 This paper investigates banks’ reporting choices in the context of bank runs. A fundamental-based run imposes market discipline on insolvent banks, but a panic-based run closes banks that could have survived with better coordination among creditors. We aug ... Full text Cite

Properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game

Journal Article Journal of Accounting and Economics · April 1, 2017 We characterize the properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game. An impatient firm sells shares to competitive investors. The firm can signal its private information about the fundamental by retaining a fraction of the shares. In addition, t ... Full text Cite
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Education, Training & Certifications


University of Minnesota, Twin Cities · 2011 Ph.D.
The University of Chicago · 2005 Ph.D.
The University of Chicago · 2003 M.S.
University of Science and Technology of China (China) · 2002 B.S.