Overview
Xu Jiang, PhD, Associate Professor of Business Administration; BA (University of Science and Technology of China), PhD (University of Minnesota).
Professor Jiang joined Fuqua faculty after serving as an assistant professor of accounting at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business. Professor Jiang’s research is in the area of theoretical models in disclosure and economic consequences of accounting standards. His current work focuses on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism and fair value accounting. He teaches financial accounting.
Professor Jiang joined Fuqua faculty after serving as an assistant professor of accounting at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business. Professor Jiang’s research is in the area of theoretical models in disclosure and economic consequences of accounting standards. His current work focuses on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism and fair value accounting. He teaches financial accounting.
Current Appointments & Affiliations
Associate Professor of Business Administration
·
2021 - Present
Fuqua School of Business
Recent Publications
Firm value and market liquidity around the adoption of common accounting standards
Journal Article Journal of Accounting and Economics · August 1, 2019 The adoption of common accounting standards generates both a precision effect and a network effect. When firms use common standards, investors can leverage their knowledge about the standards to process more financial reports. Embedding both effects into t ... Full text CiteReporting choices in the shadow of bank runs
Journal Article Journal of Accounting and Economics · February 1, 2018 This paper investigates banks’ reporting choices in the context of bank runs. A fundamental-based run imposes market discipline on insolvent banks, but a panic-based run closes banks that could have survived with better coordination among creditors. We aug ... Full text CiteProperties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game
Journal Article Journal of Accounting and Economics · April 1, 2017 We characterize the properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game. An impatient firm sells shares to competitive investors. The firm can signal its private information about the fundamental by retaining a fraction of the shares. In addition, t ... Full text CiteEducation, Training & Certifications
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities ·
2011
Ph.D.
The University of Chicago ·
2005
Ph.D.
The University of Chicago ·
2003
M.S.
University of Science and Technology of China (China) ·
2002
B.S.