Yingni Guo

Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory · March 1, 2025 A seller of an indivisible good designs a selling mechanism for a buyer whose private information (his type) is the distribution of his value for the good. A selling mechanism includes both a menu of sequential pricing, and a menu of information disclosure ... Full text Open Access Cite

Robust Monopoly Regulation

Journal Article American Economic Review · February 1, 2025 Featured Publication We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his reali ... Full text Open Access Cite

Regret-Minimizing Project Choice

Journal Article Econometrica · September 1, 2023 Featured Publication An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism that minimizes the principal's worst-case regret. We compare the single-pro ... Full text Open Access Cite

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Education, Training & Certifications

Yale University · 2014 Ph.D.