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Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets

Publication ,  Journal Article
Stern, R; Eva, B
Published in: Philosophy of Science
January 1, 2025

Some authors maintain that we can use causal Bayes nets to infer whether X →Y or X ←Y by consulting a probability distribution defined over some exogenous source of variation for X or Y. We raise a problem for this approach. Specifically, we point out that there are cases where an exogenous cause of X (Ex) has no probabilistic influence on Y no matter the direction of causation—namely, cases where Ex → X →Y and Ex → X ←Y are probabilistically indistinguishable. We then assess the philosophical significance of this problem and discuss some potential solutions.

Duke Scholars

Published In

Philosophy of Science

DOI

EISSN

1539-767X

ISSN

0031-8248

Publication Date

January 1, 2025

Related Subject Headings

  • Science Studies
  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 5002 History and philosophy of specific fields
  • 2203 Philosophy
  • 2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields
 

Citation

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Stern, R., & Eva, B. (2025). Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2025.10102
Stern, R., and B. Eva. “Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets.” Philosophy of Science, January 1, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2025.10102.
Stern R, Eva B. Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets. Philosophy of Science. 2025 Jan 1;
Stern, R., and B. Eva. “Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets.” Philosophy of Science, Jan. 2025. Scopus, doi:10.1017/psa.2025.10102.
Stern R, Eva B. Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets. Philosophy of Science. 2025 Jan 1;
Journal cover image

Published In

Philosophy of Science

DOI

EISSN

1539-767X

ISSN

0031-8248

Publication Date

January 1, 2025

Related Subject Headings

  • Science Studies
  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 5002 History and philosophy of specific fields
  • 2203 Philosophy
  • 2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields