<div> Addicted to Conforming:&nbsp; </div> <div> A Dynamic Theory of Preference Falsification </div>

Standard models of preference falsification (PF) treat conformity as a static optimization problem: individuals instantaneously calculate the costs of nonconformity based on current social pressure. This paper challenges that assumption by formalizing PF as a path-dependent process. Integrating evolutionary dynamics with bounded rationality, I develop an endogenous model where myopic agents build a "stock of falsification capital" under cognitive uncertainty. Driven by adjacent complementarity, each act of misrepresentation lowers the psychological marginal cost of future PF, trapping agents in a self-reinforcing loop of "persona preservation." Rather than assuming forward-looking optimization akin to Beckerian rational addiction models, this framework uses adaptive learning dynamics, showcasing how agents become locked into Pareto-inefficient equilibria of dishonesty even when social pressure subsides. Formal stability analysis using the system's Jacobian characterizes two distinct regimes: (i) social equilibria sustained purely by psychological hysteresis, and (ii) "cold-turkey" cascades, where exogenous shocks push the falsification stock below a critical threshold, triggering a discontinuous collapse (modeled as a saddle-node bifurcation). Historical cases, including the 1989 Eastern European revolutions and the persistence of authoritarian values in post-Spring Egypt, are shown to fit the model's comparative statics. The results provide a behavioral micro-foundation for the puzzle of persistent suboptimal equilibria, such as authoritarian resilience and political polarization.

Duke Scholars

Author Fasih Zulfiqar