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Elsevier BV

Market Structure, Internal Capital Markets, and the Boundaries of the Firm

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Mathews, RD; Robinson, DT
2006

We study how a firm's optimal integration decision depends on the interaction between the product markets and capital markets in which it operates. An integrated firm operates an internal capital market, which provides allocative flexibility but does not allow the firm to commit to specific capital allocations in advance. A stand-alone firm, in contrast, raises capital ex ante in traditional markets and cannot change its capital level ex post, so it lacks ex post flexibility but has greater ex ante commitment ability. We show that the integrator's resource flexibility can deter entry from stand-alone firms when product markets are uncertain. This is most salient for a downstream integrator, who does not wish to foreclose a potential future supply option. On the other hand, the integrator's capital commitment problems can invite predatory capital raising from a stand alone when product market uncertainty is low. This is most salient for horizontal integrators. We also illustrate how hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can dominate either vertical or horizontal integration by offering some of the benefits of integration without imposing these strategic costs.

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Publication Date

2006
 

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Mathews, R. D., & Robinson, D. T. (2006). Market Structure, Internal Capital Markets, and the Boundaries of the Firm. Elsevier BV. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.925251
Mathews, Richmond D., and David T. Robinson. “Market Structure, Internal Capital Markets, and the Boundaries of the Firm.” Elsevier BV, 2006. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.925251.
Mathews, Richmond D., and David T. Robinson. “Market Structure, Internal Capital Markets, and the Boundaries of the Firm.” Elsevier BV, 2006. Crossref, doi:10.2139/ssrn.925251.

DOI

Publication Date

2006