Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Journal Article (Journal Article)

A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Under individual persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends only on her state. The sender designates a subgroup of rubber-stampers, another of fully informed voters, and a third of partially informed voters. The most demanding voters are strategically accorded high-quality information.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Bardhi, A; Guo, Y

Published Date

  • September 1, 2018

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 13 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 1111 - 1149

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1555-7561

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1933-6837

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.3982/TE2834

Citation Source

  • Scopus