Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Journal Article (Journal Article)

Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Gayle, WR; Marshall, RC; Marx, LM; Richard, JF

Published Date

  • August 1, 2011

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 39 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 39 - 56

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-7160

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0889-938X

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s11151-011-9303-y

Citation Source

  • Scopus