Leslie M. Marx | Scholars@Duke

Leslie M. Marx
Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor of Business Administration

Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.

Current Appointments & Affiliations

Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor of Business Administration, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 2013
Professor of Business Administration, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 2008
Professor of Economics, Economics, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences 2008
Faculty Network Member of The Energy Initiative, Duke University Energy Initiative, Initiatives 2012

Contact Information

A411 Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708-0120
marx@duke.edu (919) 660-7762
Fuqua Faculty Profile

Background
Education, Training, & Certifications
- Ph.D., Northwestern University 1994
- M.A., Northwestern University 1991
- B.S., Duke University 1989
Duke Appointment History
- Associate Professor of Business Administration, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 2002 - 2008
Recognition
In the News
- JUN 19, 2019
  
  Anti-Trust Panel: Big Is OK, But Anti-Competitive Behavior Will Get You Caught
- MAR 11, 2019 Duke Magazine
  
  This Fuqua Professor Always Makes Time for Fencing
- NOV 12, 2013 Washington Post
  
  Confused about the spectrum debate? These two commercials will help
- OCT 9, 2013 All Things D
  
  Leslie Marx: An open spectrum auction is best for consumers and public safety
- SEP 20, 2013
  
  Fuqua's Leslie Marks to Meet With FCC on Spectrum Auctions
Research
Selected Grants
- Applied Mechanism Design awarded by National Science Foundation 2009 - 2011
External Relationships
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Bates White, LLC
Publications & Artistic Works
Selected Publications
- Books
  - Marshall, Robert C., and Leslie M. Marx. The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings. Vol. 1, 2012.
- Academic Articles
  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 187 (May 1, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism.” Games and Economic Behavior 120 (March 1, 2020): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.001.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Merger review with intermediate buyer power.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 67 (December 1, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102531.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Merger review for markets with buyer power.” Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 6 (December 1, 2019): 2967–3017. https://doi.org/10.1086/702173.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Mix-and-match divestitures and merger harm.” Japanese Economic Review 70, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 346–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12237.
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  - Delacrétaz, D., S. Loertscher, L. M. Marx, and T. Wilkening. “Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade.” Journal of Economic Theory 179 (January 1, 2019): 416–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.004.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Auctions with bid credits and resale.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 55 (November 1, 2017): 58–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002.
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  - Marx, L. M. “Defending against potential collusion by your suppliers—26th Colin Clark Memorial Lecture.” Economic Analysis and Policy 53 (March 1, 2017): 123–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2017.01.002.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Club good intermediaries.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (January 1, 2017): 430–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.007.
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  - Loertscher, S., L. M. Marx, and T. Wilkening. “A long way coming: Designing centralized markets with privately informed buyers and sellers.” Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 857–97. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.4.857.
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  - Kumar, V., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and L. Samkharadze. “Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 39 (January 1, 2015): 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.002.
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  - Marx, L. M., C. Mezzetti, and R. C. Marshall. “Antitrust leniency with multiproduct colluders.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 3 (January 1, 2015): 205–40. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140054.
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  - Marx, L. M., and C. Mezzetti. “Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms.” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 305–32. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnu008.
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  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses.” Review of Industrial Organization 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 245–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-014-9427-y.
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  - Kovacic, W. E., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and H. L. White. “Plus factors and agreement in antitrust law.” Michigan Law Review 110, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 393–436.
  - Heeb, Randal, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx. “Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct.” Chicago Journal of International Law 10 (November 9, 2011): 213–213.
  - Lopomo, G., L. M. Marx, and P. Sun. “Bidder collusion at first-price auctions.” Review of Economic Design 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 177–211. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9.
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  - Gayle, W. R., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and J. F. Richard. “Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.” Review of Industrial Organization 39, no. 1 (August 1, 2011): 39–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9303-y.
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  - Lopomo, G., L. M. Marx, D. McAdams, and B. Murray. “Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options for the United States.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 25–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/req024.
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  - Brusco, S., G. Lopomo, and L. M. Marx. “The economics of contingent re-auctions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 165–93. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.2.165.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Break-up fees and bargaining power in sequential contracting.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 28, no. 5 (September 1, 2010): 451–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.11.001.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Slotting allowances and scarce shelf space.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 575–603. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00262.x.
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  - Marx, L. M., and F. Squintani. “Individual accountability in teams.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 72, no. 1 (October 1, 2009): 260–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.009.
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  - Brusco, S., G. Lopomo, and L. M. Marx. “The 'Google effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz auction.” Information Economics and Policy 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 101–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.03.001.
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  - Marshall, R. C., and L. M. Marx. “The vulnerability of auctions to bidder collusion.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 883–910. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.883.
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  - Kovacic, W. E., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and S. P. Schulenberg. “Quantitative analysis of coordinated effects.” Antitrust Law Journal 76, no. 2 (January 1, 2009): 397–430.
  - Marshall, R. C., L. M. Marx, and M. E. Raiff. “Cartel price announcements: The vitamins industry.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, no. 3 (May 1, 2008): 762–802. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.07.001.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Rent shifting and the order of negotiations.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, no. 5 (October 1, 2007): 1109–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.03.001.
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  - Connolly, M., and E. Kwerel. “Economics at the federal communications commission: 2006-2007.” Review of Industrial Organization 31, no. 2 (September 1, 2007): 107–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-007-9149-5.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets.” Rand Journal of Economics 38, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 823–43.
  - Marshall, R. C., and L. M. Marx. “Bidder collusion.” Journal of Economic Theory 133, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 374–402. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.004.
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  - Binsbergen, Jules H. van, and Leslie M. Marx. “Exploring Relations Between Decision Analysis and Game Theory,” January 16, 2007.
  - Kovacic, W. E., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and M. E. Raiff. “Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel.” Contributions to Economic Analysis 282 (January 1, 2007): 149–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82006-7.
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  - Marx, L. M. “Economics at the Federal Communications Commission.” Review of Industrial Organization 29, no. 4 (2006): 349–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9120-x.
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  - Lopomo, Giuseppe, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx. “Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 5, no. 1 (June 2005): 1–28.
  - Lopomo, G., R. C. Marshall, and L. M. Marx. “Inefficiency of collusion at english auctions.” Contributions to Theoretical Economics 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2005). https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1156.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, no. 10 (December 1, 2004): 1399–1414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.11.003.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity: Comment.” American Economic Review 94, no. 3 (June 1, 2004): 796–801. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464588.
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  - Barclay, M. J., L. M. Marx, and C. W. Smith. “The joint determination of leverage and maturity.” Journal of Corporate Finance 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 149–67.
  - MacDonald, G., and L. M. Marx. “Adverse specialization.” Journal of Political Economy 109, no. 4 (January 1, 2001): 864–99. https://doi.org/10.1086/322084.
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  - Marx, L. M., D. Mayers, and C. W. Smith. “Insurer Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation as Complements.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 68, no. 3 (January 1, 2001): 449–64. https://doi.org/10.2307/2678118.
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  - Marx, Leslie M., and Steven A. Matthews. “Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project.” The Review of Economic Studies 67, no. 2 (April 2000).
  - Frei, F. X., R. Kalakota, A. J. Leone, and L. M. Marx. “Process variation as a determinant of bank performance: Evidence from the retail banking study.” Management Science 45, no. 9 (January 1, 1999): 1210–20. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.9.1210.
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  - Kandel, E., and L. M. Marx. “Payments for order flow on Nasdaq.” Journal of Finance 54, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 35–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00098.
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  - Kandel, E., and L. M. Marx. “Odd-eighth avoidance as a defense against SOES bandits.” Journal of Financial Economics 51, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 85–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00044-0.
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  - Marx, L. M. “Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance.” Games and Economic Behavior 26, no. 2 (January 1, 1999): 253–78. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0660.
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  - Marx, L. M., and G. Shaffer. “Predatory accommodation: Below-cost pricing without exclusion in intermediate goods markets.” Rand Journal of Economics 30, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 22–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/2556044.
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  - Barclay, M. J., E. Kandel, and L. M. Marx. “The effects of transaction costs on stock prices and trading volume.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 7, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 130–50. https://doi.org/10.1006/jfin.1998.0238.
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  - Marx, L. M. “Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity.” Review of Economic Design 3, no. 4 (January 1, 1998): 371–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050022.
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  - Marx, L. M., and J. M. Swinkels. “Order independence for iterated weak dominance.” Games and Economic Behavior 18, no. 2 (February 1, 1997): 219–45. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0525.
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  - Kandel, E., and L. M. Marx. “Nasdaq market structure and spread patterns.” Journal of Financial Economics 45, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 61–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(96)00894-X.
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  - Marx, L. M., J. S. Rubenstein, W. Colin, D. Jackson, C. Lockwood, and J. Molloy. “Cost Effective Use of Muscle Relaxants: A Decision Analysis.” Pediatrics 100 (1997): 451–52.
- Book Sections
  - Marx, L. M., R. Green, and R. Marshall. “Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly.” In Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, edited by R. Blair and D. Sokol. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015.
  - Marx, L. M., R. Marshall, and C. Mezzetti. “What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caught.” In Competition Law and Economics: Beyond Monopoly Regulation. East-West Center and Korea Development Institute Monograph Series, 2015.
  - Marx, L. M., and C. Mazzetti. “Leniency, Profiling and Reverse Profiling: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities.” In Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion. Hart Publishing, 2015.
  - Marx, L. M., E. Green, and R. C. Marshall. “Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, edited by R. D. Blair and D. D. Sokol, 464–97. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.
  - Marx, L. M., and R. C. Marshall. “Section 1 Compliance from an Economic Perspective.” In William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum An Antitrust Tribute, edited by N. Charbit and E. Ramundo, Vol. 2. Exhibit A, 2014.
  - Marshall, R. C., L. M. Marx, and M. J. Meurer. “The economics of bidder collusion.” In International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, 194:367–97, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_14.
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  - Marx, L. M., R. Marshall, and M. Meurer. “The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion.” In Game Theory and Business Applications, 2nd Edition, edited by K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson. Springer, 2014.
  - Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses.” In Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, 9781107034129:552–78, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139524421.023.
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  - Marx, L. M., W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, and M. Raiff. “Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements.” In Handbook of Procurement, edited by N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  - Marx, L. M., E. Kovacic, R. C. Marshall, and S. P. Schulenberg. “Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion.” In Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, 2007, edited by B. E. Hawk, n.d.
Teaching & Mentoring
Recent Courses

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Education, Training, & Certifications

Duke Appointment History

In the News

Selected Grants

External Relationships

Selected Publications

Books

Academic Articles

Book Sections

Recent Courses