Overview
Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.
Current Appointments & Affiliations
Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
·
2013 - Present
Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Business Administration
·
2008 - Present
Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Economics
·
2008 - Present
Economics,
Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
Recent Publications
Coordination in the Fight against Collusion
Journal Article American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · January 1, 2024 While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely ... Full text CiteBilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply
Journal Article Management Science · February 1, 2023 We study a bilateral trade problem with multiunit demand and supply and one-dimensional private information. Each agent geometrically discounts additional units by a constant factor. We show that when goods are complements, the incentive problem-measured a ... Full text CiteAsymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
Journal Article Games and Economic Behavior · January 1, 2023 We develop a prior-free mechanism for an asset market that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and asymptotically optimal—as the number of agents grows large, the designer's profit from using thi ... Full text CiteRecent Grants
Applied Mechanism Design
ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2009 - 2011View All Grants
Education, Training & Certifications
Northwestern University ·
1994
Ph.D.