Skip to main content

Leslie M. Marx

Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
Fuqua School of Business
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708-0120
A411 Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708

Overview


Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other …

Current Appointments & Affiliations


Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor of Business Administration · 2013 - Present Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Business Administration · 2008 - Present Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Economics · 2008 - Present Economics, Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

In the News


Published June 19, 2019
Anti-Trust Panel: Big Is OK, But Anti-Competitive Behavior Will Get You Caught
Published March 11, 2019
This Fuqua Professor Always Makes Time for Fencing
Published November 12, 2013
Confused about the spectrum debate? These two commercials will help

View All News

Recent Publications


Coordination in the Fight against Collusion

Journal Article American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · January 1, 2024 While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely ... Full text Cite

Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply

Journal Article Management Science · February 1, 2023 We study a bilateral trade problem with multiunit demand and supply and one-dimensional private information. Each agent geometrically discounts additional units by a constant factor. We show that when goods are complements, the incentive problem-measured a ... Full text Cite

Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms

Journal Article Games and Economic Behavior · January 1, 2023 We develop a prior-free mechanism for an asset market that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and asymptotically optimal—as the number of agents grows large, the designer's profit from using thi ... Full text Cite
View All Publications

Recent Grants


Applied Mechanism Design

ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2009 - 2011

View All Grants

Education, Training & Certifications


Northwestern University · 1994 Ph.D.