Skip to main content

Leslie M. Marx

Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Business Administration
Fuqua School of Business
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708-0120
A411 Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708

Overview


Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.

Current Appointments & Affiliations


Robert A. Bandeen Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Business Administration · 2025 - Present Fuqua School of Business
Professor Emeritus of Business Administration · 2025 - Present Fuqua School of Business

In the News


Published May 1, 2025
Fuqua Study Details Price Collusion at the Gas Pump
Published June 19, 2019
Anti-Trust Panel: Big Is OK, But Anti-Competitive Behavior Will Get You Caught
Published March 11, 2019
This Fuqua Professor Always Makes Time for Fencing

View All News

Recent Publications


Asymmetric Information Sharing in Oligopoly: A Natural Experiment in Retail Gasoline

Journal Article Journal of Political Economy · July 1, 2025 Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to as ... Full text Cite

Coordination in the Fight against Collusion

Journal Article American Economic Journal Microeconomics · January 1, 2024 While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely ... Full text Cite

Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply

Journal Article Management Science · February 1, 2023 We study a bilateral trade problem with multiunit demand and supply and one-dimensional private information. Each agent geometrically discounts additional units by a constant factor. We show that when goods are complements, the incentive problem-measured a ... Full text Cite
View All Publications

Recent Grants


Applied Mechanism Design

ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2009 - 2011

View All Grants

Education, Training & Certifications


Northwestern University · 1994 Ph.D.