Overview
Taylor's primary research interest is microeconomic theory with emphasis on the areas of Industrial Organization, Political Economy, and the Theory of Contracts. He has worked on a variety of topics such as: the optimal design of research contests, the causes and timing of market crashes, and consumer privacy. Professor Taylor's research has been supported by grants from the National
Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Texas Higher Education
Coordinating Board, among others.
He served as an associate editor for the American Economic Review from 1995 to 2001, and is currently on the editorial boards of the RAND Journal of Economics, the Journal of Industrial Organization, the BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, and the BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy.
He served as an associate editor for the American Economic Review from 1995 to 2001, and is currently on the editorial boards of the RAND Journal of Economics, the Journal of Industrial Organization, the BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, and the BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy.
Current Appointments & Affiliations
Professor of Economics
·
2000 - Present
Economics,
Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
Recent Publications
Setbacks, Shutdowns, and Overruns
Journal Article Econometrica · May 1, 2024 We investigate optimal project management in a setting plagued by an indefinite number of setbacks that are discovered en route to project completion. The contractor can cover up delays in progress due to shirking either by making false claims of setbacks ... Full text CiteMake it 'til you fake it
Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory · April 1, 2024 We study the dynamics of fraud and trust in a continuous-time reputation game. The principal wishes to approve a real project and reject a fake. The agent is either an ethical type that produces a real project, or a strategic type that also can produce a f ... Full text CiteWorking for References
Journal Article American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · January 1, 2023 We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever ... Full text CiteRecent Grants
Collaborative Research: Monotone Methods in Dynamic Screening Contracts
ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2011 - 2015Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets
ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2004 - 2008Consumer Profiles, Consumer Privacy, and the Information Marketplace
ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2002 - 2004View All Grants
Education, Training & Certifications
Yale University ·
1992
Ph.D.
University of Washington ·
1986
B.A.