Research Interests
Integrating applied microeconomic theory with political economy of beliefs: My primary research strand formalizes the concept of habitual preference falsification; by fusing rational addiction models with public choice theory, I derive the dynamic stability conditions under which societies become locked into "falsification traps" despite exogenous shocks. I apply similar game-theoretic tools to the study of modern autocracy in my work on sacralized digital authoritarianism, modeling how regimes use information design and "sacred" signaling to solve coordination problems among security agents and crowdsource repression.
The behavioral economics of repression: Complementing this theoretical mechanism with rigorous empirics, in “When Repression Backfires,” I use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and quasi-experimental variation (event-study DiD/RDiT) around intra-survey repression shocks in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Sudan to overturn the monotonic calculus of conformity. I find that perceived coercion triggers sharper reactance when the state can credibly punish, making repression backfire most where state capacity is highest. These papers reveal how repression and governance jointly warp policy preferences, with implications for aid and reform in fragile states.
Political economy of development: Beyond individual strategic behavior, I examine the macro-institutional constraints on development. In collaboration with Timur Kuran, I investigate the modernization of the Muslim world, challenging linear development models by conceptualizing modernization as a sector-specific process that generates uneven institutional outcomes. Across these strands, I employ rigorous identification strategies—from difference-in-differences to regression discontinuity designs—to empirically validate how repression, governance, and social norms jointly warp economic incentives in fragile states.