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Peng Sun

J.B. Fuqua Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
Fuqua School of Business
Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120
100 Fuqua Drive, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708

Overview


Peng Sun is a JB Fuqua Professor in the Decision Sciences area at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He researches mathematical theories and models for resource allocation decisions under uncertainty, and incentive issues in dynamic environments. His work spans a range of applications areas, from operations management, economics, finance, marketing, to health care and sustainability. He serves a Department Editor at Management Science and an Associate Editor at Operations Research, two leading academic journals of the profession of Operations Research and Management Science. At the Fuqua School, Professor Sun has taught MBA core course Decision Models and elective course Strategic Modeling and Business Dynamics, and PhD course Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control.

Current Appointments & Affiliations


J.B. Fuqua Distinguished Professor of Business Administration · 2019 - Present Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Business Administration · 2015 - Present Fuqua School of Business

In the News


Published May 7, 2019
Duke Adds 21 Faculty to Distinguished Faculty Rank
Published April 24, 2018
How to Make Firms Disclose Environmental Violations: Pay Them

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Recent Publications


Funding the Real Deal: Dynamic Moral Hazard with Adverse Selection

Journal Article Operations Research · May 1, 2026 We study dynamic contracts that incentivize an agent to exert effort to increase the arrival rate of a Poisson breakthrough, where both the effort cost and the effort level at any time are the agent’s private information. Optimally, the principal offers a ... Full text Cite

Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities

Journal Article Operations Research · September 1, 2024 In this paper, we explore how to uncover an adverse issue that may occur in organizations with the capability to evade detection. To that end, we formalize the problem of designing efficient auditing and remedial strategies as a dynamic mechanism design mo ... Full text Cite

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost

Journal Article Management Science · January 1, 2024 This paper studies a dynamic principal–agent setting in which the principal needs to dynamically schedule an agent to work or be suspended. When the agent is directed to work and exert effort, the arrival rate of a Poisson process is increased, which incre ... Full text Cite
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Recent Grants


Applied Mechanism Design

ResearchCo-Principal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2009 - 2011

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Education


Massachusetts Institute of Technology · 2003 Ph.D.