Overview
Peng Sun is a JB Fuqua Professor in the Decision Sciences area at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He researches mathematical theories and models for resource allocation decisions under uncertainty, and incentive issues in dynamic environments. His work spans a range of applications areas, from operations management, economics, finance, marketing, to health care and sustainability. He serves a Department Editor at Management Science and an Associate Editor at Operations Research, two leading academic journals of the profession of Operations Research and Management Science. At the Fuqua School, Professor Sun has taught MBA core course Decision Models and elective course Strategic Modeling and Business Dynamics, and PhD course Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control.
Current Appointments & Affiliations
J.B. Fuqua Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
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2019 - Present
Fuqua School of Business
Professor of Business Administration
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2015 - Present
Fuqua School of Business
Recent Publications
Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities
Journal Article Operations Research · September 1, 2024 In this paper, we explore how to uncover an adverse issue that may occur in organizations with the capability to evade detection. To that end, we formalize the problem of designing efficient auditing and remedial strategies as a dynamic mechanism design mo ... Full text CitePunish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost
Journal Article Management Science · January 1, 2024 This paper studies a dynamic principal–agent setting in which the principal needs to dynamically schedule an agent to work or be suspended. When the agent is directed to work and exert effort, the arrival rate of a Poisson process is increased, which incre ... Full text CiteEfficient Resource Allocation Contracts to Reduce Adverse Events
Journal Article Operations Research · September 1, 2023 Motivated by the allocation of online visits to product, service, and content suppliers in the platform economy, we consider a dynamic contract design problem in which a principal constantly determines the allocation of a resource (online visits) to multip ... Full text CiteRecent Grants
Applied Mechanism Design
ResearchCo-Principal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2009 - 2011View All Grants
Education, Training & Certifications
Massachusetts Institute of Technology ·
2003
Ph.D.