The role of bank monitoring in borrowers[U+05F3] discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations
Publication
, Journal Article
Vashishtha, R
Published in: Journal of Accounting and Economics
January 1, 2014
This study uses covenant violations to provide evidence on how firms make disclosure decisions in the presence of enhanced bank monitoring. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that firms reduce disclosure following covenant violations. A series of analyses suggest that part of this decline in disclosure reflects a delegation of monitoring to banks by shareholders who consequently demand less disclosure. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Accounting and Economics
DOI
ISSN
0165-4101
Publication Date
January 1, 2014
Volume
57
Issue
2-3
Start / End Page
176 / 195
Related Subject Headings
- Accounting
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
- 1402 Applied Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Vashishtha, R. (2014). The role of bank monitoring in borrowers[U+05F3] discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 57(2–3), 176–195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.002
Vashishtha, R. “The role of bank monitoring in borrowers[U+05F3] discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 57, no. 2–3 (January 1, 2014): 176–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.002.
Vashishtha R. The role of bank monitoring in borrowers[U+05F3] discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2014 Jan 1;57(2–3):176–95.
Vashishtha, R. “The role of bank monitoring in borrowers[U+05F3] discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 57, no. 2–3, Jan. 2014, pp. 176–95. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.002.
Vashishtha R. The role of bank monitoring in borrowers[U+05F3] discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2014 Jan 1;57(2–3):176–195.
Published In
Journal of Accounting and Economics
DOI
ISSN
0165-4101
Publication Date
January 1, 2014
Volume
57
Issue
2-3
Start / End Page
176 / 195
Related Subject Headings
- Accounting
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
- 1402 Applied Economics