Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default
Publication
, Journal Article
Schwarcz, S
Published in: Yale Journal on Regulation
2014
Duke Scholars
Published In
Yale Journal on Regulation
Publication Date
2014
Volume
31
Start / End Page
269 / 302
Related Subject Headings
- 1801 Law
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Schwarcz, S. (2014). Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default. Yale Journal on Regulation, 31, 269–302.
Schwarcz, S. “Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default.” Yale Journal on Regulation 31 (2014): 269–302.
Schwarcz S. Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default. Yale Journal on Regulation. 2014;31:269–302.
Schwarcz, S. “Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default.” Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 31, 2014, pp. 269–302.
Schwarcz S. Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default. Yale Journal on Regulation. 2014;31:269–302.
Published In
Yale Journal on Regulation
Publication Date
2014
Volume
31
Start / End Page
269 / 302
Related Subject Headings
- 1801 Law