Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting: On Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market
Publication
, Journal Article
Robinson, PA; Sloan, FA; Eldred, LM
Published in: Journal of Risk and Insurance
November 2016
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Risk and Insurance
DOI
ISSN
0022-4367
Publication Date
November 2016
Related Subject Headings
- Finance
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Robinson, P. A., Sloan, F. A., & Eldred, L. M. (2016). Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting: On Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market. Journal of Risk and Insurance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12170
Robinson, P. A., F. A. Sloan, and L. M. Eldred. “Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting: On Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, November 2016. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12170.
Robinson PA, Sloan FA, Eldred LM. Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting: On Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2016 Nov;
Robinson, P. A., et al. “Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting: On Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, Nov. 2016. Manual, doi:10.1111/jori.12170.
Robinson PA, Sloan FA, Eldred LM. Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting: On Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2016 Nov;
Published In
Journal of Risk and Insurance
DOI
ISSN
0022-4367
Publication Date
November 2016
Related Subject Headings
- Finance
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment