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Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee

Publication ,  Journal Article
Name Correa, AJ; Yildirim, H
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior
May 1, 2021

An uninformed principal appoints a committee of experts to vote on a multi-attribute alternative, such as an interdisciplinary project. Each expert evaluates one attribute and is biased toward it (specialty bias). The principal values all attributes equally but has a status quo bias, reflecting the organizational cost of a change. We study whether the principal would compose the committee of more or less specialty-biased experts. We show that her optimal composition is nonmonotonic in the majority rule, with the most biased experts appointed under intermediate rules. We then show that the principal would be less concerned about the committee composition if its members can be uninformed, as they induce the informed to vote less strategically. Surprisingly, although uninformed members lower the quality of the committee's decision, the principal may prefer to have some when its composition is suboptimal, and the majority rule is sufficiently extreme, such as the unanimity.

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Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

May 1, 2021

Volume

127

Start / End Page

1 / 27

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory
 

Citation

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Name Correa, A. J., & Yildirim, H. (2021). Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee. Games and Economic Behavior, 127, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010
Name Correa, A. J., and H. Yildirim. “Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee.” Games and Economic Behavior 127 (May 1, 2021): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010.
Name Correa AJ, Yildirim H. Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee. Games and Economic Behavior. 2021 May 1;127:1–27.
Name Correa, A. J., and H. Yildirim. “Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 127, May 2021, pp. 1–27. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010.
Name Correa AJ, Yildirim H. Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee. Games and Economic Behavior. 2021 May 1;127:1–27.
Journal cover image

Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

May 1, 2021

Volume

127

Start / End Page

1 / 27

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory